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Summary
This thesis consists of two essays on ﬁnancial intermediaries. The ﬁrst
essay studies a causal eﬀect of institutional ownership (IO) on bank loan
pricing, using the Russell Index 1000 inclusion/exclusion as the disconti-
nuity design setting. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that an exogenous positive shock
in institutional ownership appears to only aﬀect the pricing term of bank
loans but not the non-pricing terms. On average, a 35 % increase in IO will
lead to a 29 bps lower loan spread which is about 1/5 of the average spread.
However, the non-pricing terms such as collateral, maturity, and covenants
do not change with the increase in IO. The reduction in loan spread is sup-
ported by the evidence that ﬁrms with high IO will have lower credit risk
measured by expected default frequency using Merton model. Also, this
eﬀect is weaker for the family ﬁrms. Further investigation reveals that in-
crease in liquidity and direct monitoring from institutional investors could
be the channels through which institutional ownership aﬀects bank loans
pricing. Moreover, although the cost of bank loan is lower for ﬁrms with
higher institutional ownership, these ﬁrms do not borrow more frequently
than those with lower institutional ownership.
The second essay investigates the misreporting and mis-assessment of
corporate credit ratings by credit rating agencies (CRAs). We distinguish
between "mis-assessment", which is the noise from the unobservable true
rating to the rating perceived by CRAs (the internal rating), and "misre-
porting", which is the diﬀerence between perceived and reported rating by
CRAs. Using a sample of corporate credit ratings during 1986-2011, we
ﬁnd that the mis-assessment in credit rating is very small and statistically
insigniﬁcant. Also, there is a U-shaped relationship between true credit rat-
ing and misreporting probability. Speciﬁcally, CRAs misreport the credit
ratings for high-grade ﬁrms with a probability of 3%, for middle-grade ﬁrms
with a probability of 0, and for low-grade ﬁrms with a probability of 6%.
Second, the misreporting behavior of CRAs diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the
industries. The ﬁnancial industry has the highest misreporting probabil-
ity (35% in the lowest-grade ﬁrms) and the largest misreporting magnitude
(rating grade jump between true and reported grade). The energy industry
has the lowest misreporting probability. Last, when economic conditions
are bad, the credit rating agent is more likely to deﬂate the rating.
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Ownership Aﬀect Bank Loan
Pricing: Evidence from a
Regression Discontinuity Design
1.1 Introduction
The syndicated loan market has become the most important source of
global corporate ﬁnancing over the past 20 years. In year 2009, the size of
international syndicated loan market reached a record high of $1.8 trillion,
which is even larger than the international bond markets with a size of
$1.5 trillion (Chui, Domanski, Kugler, and Shek, 2010). Therefore, it is
of immense economic signiﬁcance to understand the factors that aﬀect the
cost of bank loan given the size of the syndicate loan market.
In this paper, I focus on how institutional ownership (IO hereafter) of
stocks of a borrowing ﬁrm inﬂuences its bank loan pricing. Institutional
investors own a signiﬁcant proportion of public equity in the US stock mar-
ket. The institutional equity ownership increases dramatically in the past
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decades, from 10% in the 1970s to more than 60% nowadays. This dra-
matic change in institutional ownership is believed to have great impact on
the corporate governance structure of company. As suggested in Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), corporate governance is an important channel through
which suppliers of capital to corporation assure themselves of getting a re-
turn on their investment. While the impact of governance on cost of debt
has received recent attention in several papers (Bhojraj and Sengupta,
2003; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005; Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003;
Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007; Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam, 2009;
Roberts and Yuan, 2010), few papers have examined the impact of insti-
tutional ownership on bank loan contract terms. This paper studies this
topic, speciﬁcally focusing on the causal eﬀect of institutional ownership
on bank loan contract terms.
Theoretically, the net impact of institutional ownership on debthold-
ers is unclear. On one hand, the involvement of institutional investors in
monitoring has the potential to reduce agency problems, which in turn will
increase shareholders' value and beneﬁt debtholders. Institutional investors
may also discipline managers through shareholder activism or the threat
of exit (Gillan and Starks, 2007; Edmans, 2009; Admati and Pﬂeiderer,
2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011). Also, ownership by institutions may re-
duce coordination costs (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny,
1986) and can lower agency costs through economies of scale in delegated
monitoring. On the other hand, debtholders' concern of asset substitution
might be heightened with higher IO (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Stronger
shareholder control better aligns management and shareholders, which may
lead to wealth transfer between shareholders and debtholders (e.g. through
more dividend payout). Therefore, it is ultimately an empirical issue to test
the eﬀect of IO on bank loan pricing.
Empirically, it is a challenging task to establish the causal relation be-
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tween IO and bank loan pricing. While institutional ownership may cause
diﬀerences in bank loan pricing, the institutional investors may also choose
stocks because of some unobservable ﬁrm characteristics that drive the
bank loan pricing as well.
My empirical strategy to test the causal eﬀect of institutional ownership
on bank loan pricing utilizes a regression discontinuity design around the
Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 index cut-oﬀ.1 Speciﬁcally, all the eligible se-
curities are ranked based on their market capitalization on the last trading
day in May each year. The ﬁrst 1000 largest stocks will be included in the
Russell 1000 Index and stocks with rank from 1001th to 3000th will be in-
cluded in Russell 2000 index. The breakpoint of Russell Index 1000/2000 is
the rank of 1000th. Therefore, mechanically, those just-included stocks and
just-excluded stocks in Russell 1000 Index are very similar in terms of the
market capitalization. However, since both Russell 1000 and 2000 index are
market value weighted index, the stocks just-included and just-excluded in
Russell 1000 will get quite diﬀerent weight in the index respectively. Inter-
estingly, stocks with smaller market capitalization will be included at the
top of Russell 2000 index and have a large weight, because they are com-
pared to other smaller stocks in Russell 2000 index. In contrast, the stocks
at the bottom of Russell 1000 index will have a small weight, because they
are compared to other large stocks in Russell 1000 index. Combining with
the fact that Russell 2000 index is much more popular in the mutual fund
industry, there is a signiﬁcant jump in institutional ownership at the cutoﬀ
point (i.e., 1000th rank). Therefore, I can employ a regression discontinuity
approach to investigate the impact of the jump in institutional ownership
on bank loan pricing. To the extent that the exclusion restriction is valid,
I can investigate how other variables of interest such a loan spread, matu-
1Chang and Hong (2012) are the ﬁrst to exploit this discontinuity and ﬁnd that the
smaller ﬁrms that are just included in the more popular Russell 2000 index experience
higher returns right after the reconstitution of the index, which the authors attribute to
price pressure due to higher institutional demand for the Russell 2000 stocks.
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rity, collateral, and covenants behave around the cut-oﬀ point (i.e., 1000th
rank). I then can make causal inferences and calculate how the dependent
variables of interest respond to a given shock in institutional ownership.2
My main ﬁnding is that the exogenous positive shock in institutional
ownership of a stock caused by the index inclusion/exclusion aﬀects the
pricing of bank loans in a signiﬁcant manner. On average, a 35% increase
in IO will lead to 29 bps lower loan spread which is about 1/5 of the
average spread. However, non-pricing terms such as collateral, maturity,
and covenants do not change with the increase in IO. This evidence is
supported by the fact that ﬁrms with higher IO have a lower credit risk
which is measured by expected default frequency using Merton model.
I also examine additional channels by which an increase in IO may
aﬀect bank loan pricing. One potential channel is an increase in liquidity.
I ﬁnd that the liquidity, using Amihud measure, is 10% higher for the ﬁrms
just-excluded in the Russell 1000. An increase in liquidity may have two
eﬀects on credit risk. One eﬀect is that it can facilitate the exercise of
corporate control because it allows large shareholders to emerge to correct
managerial failure (Maug, 1998). It may also increase the liquidity fading
by these institutional investors and discipline the managers by threat to
exit" or treat of governance" (Edmans, 2009). Therefore, the liquidity
improvement will add value to the ﬁrm and this beneﬁt is shared with
debtholders. The other eﬀect is that increase in liquidity may also lower
the expected return of the ﬁrms and further directly lower the credit risk
of ﬁrms given that the ﬁrm's fundamentals stay the same.
Another potential channel through which IO may aﬀect bank loan pric-
ing is the actual monitoring eﬀort by institutional investors. The proxy-
voting participation for just-excluded ﬁrms is higher by 45 percentage
points than just-included ﬁrms. Therefore, ﬁrms with higher IO do have
2More detail will be discussed in section 1.2.
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higher participation rate than the ﬁrms with lower IO. Another supporting
evidence is that there are jumps in holding for most types of institutional
investors such as public pension funds, bank trust. Large institutional
shareholders (notably CalPERs and other public pension funds) are known
for their involvement in governance-related activities. Therefore, increase
in public pension funds' holding may mitigate the agency problem. Taken
together, these evidences demonstrate that ﬁrms with higher institutional
ownership could be monitored better by institutional investors. The beneﬁt
from better alignment between the manager and shareholders may spillover
to the debtholders.
I further investigate the cross-sectional diﬀerence of the eﬀect of IO on
bank loan pricing across family and non-family ﬁrms. I ﬁnd that the results
are weaker for the family ﬁrms, suggesting that the beneﬁts of additional
monitoring are lower when a controlling shareholder is already present in
the ﬁrm.
I also ﬁnd that, although the cost of bank loan is lower for the ﬁrms just-
excluded from Russell 1000, they do not borrow more frequently relative
to the just-included ﬁrms.
Last, I conduct several robustness tests to address the concern of ran-
domness and to check whether our results are sensitive to methodological
choices. My results are robust to alternative methodologies such as diﬀer-
ent nonparametric form or bandwidth choice. I also do the placebo tests by
picking 600th, 800th, 1200th, and 1400th ranks as the cutoﬀ points. The
results show that there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect at these random thresholds,
which suggests that the main results in this paper are not picking up a
random pattern in the sample.
Focusing on how institutional ownership causally inﬂuences the bank
loan pricing, this paper contributes to the emerging literature on the role of
corporate governance on cost of debt. Chava et al. (2009) ﬁnd that lenders
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demand a premium from borrowers with shareholder-friendly managers.
While their paper focuses on the eﬀect of takeover risk as the mechanism
of corporate governance on cost of bank loan, my paper focuses on the
institutional ownership as the mechanism of corporate governance. This
paper also complements the results in Cremers et al. (2007) and Bhojraj
and Sengupta (2003). While both papers focus on the bond return, this
paper studies the causal eﬀect of institutional ownership on bank loan.
Loan market is diﬀerent from bond market in the following aspects. First,
bondholders do not have incentive to monitor the ﬁrms due to the free-
rider problem. In contrast, banks are generally regarded as the insider of
the ﬁrms. Therefore, although higher institutional ownership would lead
to lower bond yield, it is unclear whether the increase in shareholder mon-
itoring will lower the cost of bank loan given that banks already exert
their own monitoring eﬀort. Second, bank loans are informationally more
eﬃcient than publicly traded bonds, because they are priced by the expe-
rienced loan oﬃcers with in-depth knowledge of the ﬁrms (e.g. (Altman,
Gande, and Saunders, 2010)). Therefore, bank loan market could be a bet-
ter setting to investigate the eﬀect of institutional ownership on the cost of
debt.
The rest of paper is organized as follow: Section 1.2 discusses the data
and empirical strategies. Section 1.3 shows the main empirical results.
Section 1.4 explores the channels through which the IO aﬀects bank loan
pricing. Section 1.5 presents the robustness checks. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
Russell U.S. index captures 99% of the U.S. equity market and 100%
of the investable U.S. market. The indexed stocks need to be traded on a
major U.S. exchange, with its headquarter in U.S. or asset primarily in US,
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or revenues from US. The membership is then determined by the market
capitalization at the last trading day in each May. Common stock, non-
restricted exchangeable shares and partnership units/membership interests
(in certain cases) are used to calculate a company's total market capital-
ization. If multiple share classes of common stock exist, they are combined
together. In cases where the common stock share classes are independently
from each other (e.g., tracking stocks), each class is considered for inclusion
separately.
One important characteristic of the Russell indices is that these indices
are transparent and easy for managers to construct by themselves, in con-
trast to the black box approach of the S&P 500 index. This transparency
has resulted in its popularity among a signiﬁcant fraction of mutual fund
managers. During annual reconstitution, the closing price on the last trad-
ing day in May on the primary exchange is used to determine market capi-
talization. If a security does not trade on its primary exchange, the lowest
price from another major US exchange is used. In the case where multi-
ple share classes exist, a primary trading vehicle is determined, and the
price of that primary trading vehicle" (usually the most liquid) is used in
the calculation. The impact of rebalance of Russell index is huge given its
popularity. For example, according to Nasdaq, approximately $687.9 mil-
lion shares representing $9.5 billion in value were traded in the closing 1.15
seconds on last trading day of June across the nearly 2,200 Nasdaq-listed
stocks in 2012.
I obtain the annual constituents list for the Russell 1000 and Russell
2000 from Russell Investments for the sample period of 1990 to 2006. The
sample period stops at 2006 because after that Russell Company imposes a
ﬂexible band policy. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms may stay in the prior year index if its
market value is close to the cut-oﬀ point market capitalization. Therefore, I
only use the sample before 2007 in order to obtain a clean setting. However,
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my result is qualitative the same if I include the observations after year
2006.
The validity of regression discontinuity design relies on the random-
ness of the index membership assignment around the cutoﬀ points. In
this setting, the just-included and just-excluded from Russell 1000 index
is random, which leads to a jump in institutional ownership. According
to Russell U.S. Equity Indexes Construction and Methodology" 3 , all the
eligible securities are ranked by their total market capitalization on the
last trading day in May each year. The largest 1000 stocks are included
in Russell 1000 Index and the 1001th to 3000th largest stocks are included
in the Russell 2000 Index. The breakpoint of Russell Index 1000/2000
is the rank of 1000th. Therefore, mechanically, those just-included and
just-excluded stocks in Russell 1000 Index are very similar in terms of the
market capitalization and so the assignment to the left or right of the index
threshold is essentially random. Stocks with smaller market capitalization
will be included at the top of Russell 2000 index and have large weights,
because they are compared to other smaller stocks in Russell 2000 index.
In contrast, the stocks at the bottom of Russell 1000 index will have small
weights, because they are compared to other large stocks in Russell 1000
index. Figure 1.1(a) demonstrates the continuity in market capitalization
and Figure 1.1(b) demonstrates the discontinuity in weight. Combining
with the fact that Russell 2000 index is much more popular in the mutual
fund industry, there is a signiﬁcant jump in institutional ownership at the
cutoﬀ point (1000th rank).
Therefore, I can employ a regression discontinuity approach to investi-
gate the impact of the jump in institutional ownership on bank loan pric-
ing. To the extent that the exclusion restriction is valid, I can investigate
how other variables of interest such a loan spread, maturity, collateral,
3More detail can be found at http://www.russell.com/Indexes/
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and covenants behave around the cut-oﬀ point (i.e., 1000th rank). I then
can make causal inferences and calculate how the dependent variables of
interest respond to a given shock in institutional ownership.
Indeed, I show that the just-excluded stocks in Russell 1000 index
have discontinuously higher institutional ownership compared to the just-
included stocks. Discontinuity plots with some data smoothing and break
tests proposed by Lee and Lemieux (2010) are shown in Figure 1.2(a).
The plots of institutional ownership after the reconstitution month of June
show the dramatic discontinuity. The diﬀerence in institutional ownership,
a proxy for demand by institutions between the just-included versus the
just-excluded stocks is around 35%. The mean institutional ownership per-
centage in the sample is 60%. So the diﬀerence is about one-half of this
mean, which is a sizable increase. This ﬁnding veriﬁes the premise of the
experiment that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in demand for stocks at the
bottom of the Russell 1000 and for stocks at the top of Russell 2000 index
.
The empirical strategy I employ here is to ﬁt the linear function for
the stocks around the cut-oﬀ point. Speciﬁcally, I run the linear regression
around the cutoﬀ rank 1000th:
Y = α+β1 ∗R2000+β2 ∗ |Rank|+β3 ∗ |Rank| ∗R2000+Y eari+ , (1.1)
where for |Rank| < Bandwidth, R2000 is a dummy variable that equals
1 if the stocks are in Russell 2000 index, Rank is the relative rank from
the 1000th rank with negative denoting that stocks in Russell 1000 index
and positive number denoting stocks in Russell 2000 index, and Y eari are
the year dummies. Bandwidth is the number of ﬁrms in each side of cutoﬀ
points. Year dummies are included in all regressions.
I choose the bandwidth Bandwidth = 100 for most of my tests. Essen-
tially, the choice of bandwidth faces a trade-oﬀ between testing power and
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accuracy. Larger bandwidth will have higher testing power but lower ac-
curacy for including observations that have low predicting power. I choose
100 as the bandwidth for the following reasons: ﬁrst, the choice of band-
width has great impact on the estimation result. Rule-of-thumb (ROT)
bandwidths for diﬀerent interest variables are about 80-200 for each side.
I conservatively use the same bandwidth for all variables of interest as our
baseline results and put more results on diﬀerent choice of bandwidths in
the robustness check. Second, about a half of ﬁrms in the (-100, 100) band-
width have loans information in our sample. Therefore, 100 ﬁrms on each
side of the cutoﬀ point is reasonable to get enough testing power; In the
robustness checks, I also try the Rule-of-thumb (ROT) bandwidth and try
to ﬁt the function using local polynomial with couples of variation. The
results are qualitatively the same. See section 1.5 for detail discussion.
1.3 Empirical results
In this section, I report the empirical results of discontinuity tests in IO
and loan contract terms.
1.3.1 Discontinuity Test for Institutional Ownership
In this subsection, I test whether there is a discontinuity in institutional
ownership.
As suggested in Lee and Lemieux (2010), I plot the discontinuity in
institutional ownership with some data smoothing. Results are shown in
Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.2(a), I plot average institutional ownership (in 10
rank bins" for smoothness) relative to the Russell 1000/2000 threshold.
The X-axis represents the distance from the Russell 1000/2000 threshold
where 0 represents the smallest ﬁrms in the Russell 1000, negative numbers
represent larger ﬁrms away from the last Russell 1000 rank while positive
10
numbers represent smaller ﬁrms just away from the ﬁrst Russell 2000 index
rank.
I further decompose the IO into groups based on their expected invest-
ment horizon using the classiﬁcation method developed by Bushee (1998).
I classiﬁes institutions into three groups (i.e., dedicated, quasi-indexer, and
transient), based on their past investment patterns in the areas of portfo-
lio turnover, diversiﬁcation, and momentum trading. Transient" investors
have high portfolio turnover and highly diversiﬁed portfolio holding. Ded-
icated" investors have large average investments in portfolio ﬁrms and ex-
tremely low turnover. Quasi-indexers" investors have diversiﬁed holdings
and low turnover. Figure 1.2(b) to Figure 1.2(d) show that both the tran-
sient IO and Quasi-indexer" IO have signiﬁcant jumps for just-included
Russell 2000 stocks. The jump is about 10% for transient IO and 25%
for the quasi-indexer IO. Meanwhile, there is no signiﬁcant jump for the
dedicated IO. This suggests that the diﬀerence in demand between the just-
excluded and just-included stocks mainly come from the indexer which is
obvious because they benchmark to the index and the active traders.
I also decompose the IO based on the types of institutional investors
from CDA/ Spectrum database, following Bushee (1998). I combine the
CDA type 3 (investment company) and type 4 (independent investment ad-
visor) into one group. In addition, I dig deeper to distinguish the ESOPS,
university and foundations endowments, and private/public pension funds.
Earlier research on shareholder activism (e.g., Guercio and Hawkins (1999))
shows that public pension funds pursue a highly active role in the gover-
nance of companies principally through the submission of shareholder pro-
posals. Figure 1.3(a) to Figure 1.3(f) show that there is a signiﬁcant jump
for public pension fund holding for just-excluded Russell 1000 stocks. The
jump in institutional ownership is from around 0.8% to 2.8%. I also observe
jumps for investment company holding and bank trust holding. However,
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I do not observe any signiﬁcant jumps for corporate pension fund holding,
insurance company holding, or university and foundation fund holding.
Overall, I observe a signiﬁcant jump in IO at cutoﬀ point and this
jump is concentrated in quasi-indexer (3/4 of overall jump) and transient
investors (1/4 of overall jump) but not dedicated investors. I also ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant jump in public pension fund holding, bank trust holding and
investment company holding.
1.3.2 Discontinuity Test for Bank Loan Contract Terms
In this subsection, I test whether there is any discontinuity in bank loan
contract terms. I investigate the bank loans borrowed by the ﬁrms within 1
year after index membership assignment (i.e., from July to next year June).
Since the membership assignment is mechanical and creates the exogenous
shock to the institutional demand, the diﬀerence of loan contracts for the
just-excluded and just-included stocks could be attributed to the shock of
the institutional ownership. This enables me to identify the causal eﬀect
of institutional ownership on bank loan contract. Loan spread is the all-in-
drawn spread. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan
facility has collateral requirement. Maturity is the length of loan lending in
month. Covenants is the number of distinct ﬁnancial and general covenants.
I ﬁrst plot the mean loan spread, maturity, collateral, and covenants across
all years over 10 rank intervals for 100 bins to the left of the threshold and
for 200 bins to the right of the threshold. The X-axis represents the distance
from the Russell 1000/2000 threshold where 0 represents the smallest ﬁrms
in the Russell 1000, negative numbers represent larger ﬁrms away from
the last Russell 1000 rank while positive numbers represent smaller ﬁrms
just away from the ﬁrst Russell 2000 index rank. The graph shows a clear
discontinuity in loan spread at the threshold but no signiﬁcant discontinuity
for collateral, maturity, or covenants.
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Table 1.2 reports the formal discontinuity tests for IO and bank loan
contract terms using Equation 1.1. I use the OLS for IO, loan spread, and
maturity regression, Logit regression for collateral, and Poisson regression
for covenant. Columns 1 reports the diﬀerence of IO is about 35% at the
cutoﬀ point and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Column 2 shows
that the diﬀerence in loan spread at the discontinuity is equal to 29 bps and
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Combining with the fact that the
average spread for loans around the cut-oﬀ point is 150bp, this represents
a 20% reduction in spread, which is economically signiﬁcant. Columns
3-5 show the result for collateral, maturity, and covenants. None of the
above variables are statistically signiﬁcant. Combining together, the result
suggests that the institutional ownership only aﬀects the pricing term of
loan contract but not the non-pricing terms. Column 5 shows the result
for discontinuity test for credit risk. Essentially, the loan pricing reﬂects
the credit risk of the ﬁrms. Following Merton distance to default model,
I use the expect default frequency (EDF) as my measure of credit risk.
For each ﬁrm, I calculate the monthly average EDF during year T July to
year T+1 May. I ﬁnd that ﬁrms just-included in Russell 2000 have lower
average EDF and it is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level. This evidence
supports the previous ﬁnding that ﬁrms just included in Russell 2000 will
enjoy lower loan spread compared to ﬁrms just excluded in Russell 2000.
As the main robustness test, I only use the sample of ﬁrms switching
between Russell 1000 and Russell 2000. Only the switching year and the
year before switching will be included in the sample. For example, ﬁrm A
was in Russell 1000 during 1990-1995, and switched to Russell 2000 during
1996-2006. I only use loans issued to ﬁrm A in year 1995 and 1996 for
my analysis. Also, I require that the switcher must stay in the (-100, 100)
band both before and after the switching. This is a conservative sample to
asure there is no signiﬁcant change in ﬁrm fundamentals when ﬁrms switch
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between indices. I compare the loan contract terms for the same ﬁrms in
these 2 years. Speciﬁcally, I run the ﬁrm ﬁxed-eﬀect regression for this
subsample and control for the year ﬁxed eﬀect.
Y = α + β1 ∗R2000 + Y eari + Firmi + , (1.2)
where R2000 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the stocks are in Russell
2000 index, Firmi are the ﬁrm dummies, and Y eari are the year dummies.
I use the OLS for spread and maturity regression, Logit regression for
collateral, and Poisson regression for covenant. The result is robust to the
includsion/excludsion of the year dummies, loan purpose dummies (e.g.
working capital/general purpose, etc.), and/or loan type dummies (e.g.
term loan/credit line etc.). Overall, there are 220 switchers (189 unique
ﬁrms) switching within the (-100, 100) widows in our sample. 98 unique
ﬁrms get loans, among which 56 unique ﬁrms get loans both before and
after the switch. Table 1.3 shows the regression results. First ﬁve columns
report the OLS regression results for loan spread, collateral, maturity, and
covenants respectively. Spread reduction is about 40 bps for the ﬁrms
switched from Russell 1000 to Russell 2000. Compared to the regression
discontinuity design test, the estimated sign is the same and the magnitude
is larger (29 bps for RDD) for loan spread regression. This could be due to
small sample of the switchers. Moreover, the switch does not aﬀect other
contract terms (collateral, maturity, and covenants) and none of them is
statistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the results in RDD test.
Next, I investigate the cross-sectional diﬀerence of the eﬀect of IO on
loan pricing. Table 1.4 reports this set of tests. First column investigates
whether this eﬀect is stronger for the ﬁrms close to distress. I sort ﬁrms
based on distress risk measured by the expected default frequency (EDF).
I divide the sample into high and low distress risk sub-sample using the
median of EDF at the end of May across all years. I ﬁnd that ﬁrms with
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high distress risk enjoy lower loan spread after getting an exogenous shock
in IO.
In second column of Table 1.4, I investigate whether the family ﬁrms
would beneﬁt less from the increased institutional ownership. Family ﬁrms
are regarded as having incentive structures that result in fewer agency
conﬂicts between equity and debt claimants (Anderson et al. 2003). I ﬁnd
that the eﬀect is weaker for the family ﬁrms, suggesting that the beneﬁts of
additional monitoring are lower when a controlling shareholder is already
present in the ﬁrm.
Last, I test whether ﬁrms with higher IO are more likely to borrow
from banks since they enjoy lower cost of debt. I ﬁnd that the likelihood
of borrowing is quite similar. The result is reported in Figure 1.5 and this
test is suggested in McCrary (2008). There is no evidence that the ﬁrms
with higher IO will borrow more frequently.
Taken together, these results point to a causal eﬀect of institutional
ownership on the pricing of bank loans but no eﬀect on non-pricing terms
of loan. Firms with higher IO will have lower cost of bank loan. This is
supported by the ﬁnding that ﬁrms with high institutional ownership will
have lower credit risk. In the next section, I explore the channels through
which institutional investors aﬀect pricing of bank loan.
1.4 Potential channel
In this section, I test the channels through which institutional ownership
may potentially aﬀect loan pricing.
1.4.1 Liquidity increase
In this subsection, I test whether ﬁrms with higher institutional owner-
ship will increase the liquidity of stocks. An increase in liquidity may have
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two eﬀects on credit risk. One eﬀect is that it can facilitate the exercise of
corporate control because it allows large shareholders to emerge to correct
managerial failure (Maug, 1998). It may also increase the liquidity fading
by these institutional investors and discipline the managers by threat to
exit" or treat of governance" (Edmans, 2009). Therefore, the liquidity
improvement will add value to the ﬁrm and this beneﬁt is shared with
debtholders. The other eﬀect is that increase in liquidity may also lower
the expected return of the ﬁrms and further directly lower the credit risk
of ﬁrms given that the ﬁrm's fundamentals stay the same.
Generally, more involving institutional investors will increase the liq-
uidity of the stocks and enable more and faster information incorporated
into the stock price. This is supported by the analysis of subtypes of insti-
tutional ownership, I ﬁnd that only the transient institutional shareholders
and quasi-indexers (relaxing short sale constraint) will increase the hold-
ing in Russell 2000, but not the dedicated investors. Using the RDD, I
ﬁnd that the liquidity is 10 percentage higher for the ﬁrms that are just
included in the Russell 2000. The result is presented in Table 1.5 column
1. This result is consistent with the literature suggesting that institutional
investors increase the stock liquidities.
1.4.2 Monitoring eﬀort by institutional investors
In this subsection, I test whether, besides the theoretical argument,
ﬁrms with higher institutional ownership will be monitored more by in-
stitutional investors. Generally, the predictions stem from the idea that
monitoring by institutional investors may have spillover eﬀect from share-
holders to debtholders. Therefore, higher institutional ownership ﬁrms will
enjoy the lower loan spread.
Following Crane, Michenaud, andWeston (2012), I collect data from ISS
Risk Metrics Shareholders Proposal and Vote Results database. I measure
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proxy-voting participation at the ﬁrm level in the ﬁscal year following the
index inclusion. The results are presented in Table 1.5 column 2. The
proxy-voting participation for just-excluded ﬁrms is higher by 45 percentage
points than just-included ﬁrms. Therefore, ﬁrms with higher IO do have
higher participation rate than the ﬁrms with lower IO.
I admit that the proxy-voting participation rate is not a perfect measure
for the institutional investors' monitor eﬀort, for institutional investors
could outsourcing shareholder voting to proxy advisory ﬁrms such as ISS
and Glass Lewis. Therefore, the increase in the voting rate is increasing
mechanically. In this sense, the monitoring work is fulﬁlled by the proxy
advisory ﬁrms but, at least, the higher institutional ownership make the
coordination to vote for/against the proposal easier. Moreover, the increase
in the voting rate is higher than the increase in IO, which suggests that
the expanded voting pool includes not only new institutional investors but
also the pre-existing institutional investors.
1.5 Robustness Check
In this section, I conduct several robustness tests to address the concern
of randomness and to check whether our results are sensitive to method-
ological choices.
1.5.1 Public ﬂoat adjustment by Russell
After the membership of the stocks are determined, the actual index
weights are adjusted by Russell company based on the investable shares.
The investible shares data are considered proprietary by Russell and not
available to the public. This adjustment may reduce the randomness of the
membership assignment. For example, large market capitalization ﬁrms
with small investiable shares would stay at the bottom of Russell 1000.
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These ﬁrms are not comparable to the ﬁrms on the top of Russell 2000
with similar investiable market capitalization but much smaller market
capitalization. To eliminate the ﬁrms with large adjustment made by Rus-
sell, following Crane et al. (2012), I calculate the percent diﬀerence between
the unadjusted weight using CRSP market capitalization and the adjusted
weight reported by Russell. I drop observations in the top 5% of squared
percent diﬀerence. In this way, I remove the stocks that have large weight
adjustment from the sample. The results are qualitatively the same for the
sample of excluding the 5% of observations with large adjustments.
1.5.2 Manipulation
Another concern with this design is that some ﬁrms may have incen-
tives to manipulate their index membership for the expected reduction in
ﬁnancing cost. Such manipulation would lead to self-selection and aﬀect
my causal inferences. I argue that this is unlikely for the following two
reasons. Firstly, since the smaller ﬁrms will be included in Russell 2000
index and enjoy the reduction in spread, ﬁrms need to short sell stocks
to push down the stock price. However, the stock price will go up after
the ﬁrms are included in Russell 2000 and the short position will suﬀer
a loss, which may reduce the incentive to manipulate the index inclusion.
Secondly, the ranking is only decided by the closing market capitalization
at the last trading day in May. Since diﬀerence in size for ﬁrms around
the threshold would be small, it is diﬃcult to precisely control their rank-
ing relative to other ﬁrms in the dynamic trading market. Therefore, it is
unlikely that ﬁrms could self-select on one side of the threshold. Even in
the presence of manipulation, Lee (2008) formally shows that discontinuity
design is still valid as long as ﬁrms do not have precise control over their
assignment. I further test the manipulation using density test suggested in
McCrary (2008). If the ﬁrms expect the beneﬁt of lower cost of loans and
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self-select into the Russell 2000 index, we should observe that ﬁrms at the
top of Russell 2000 index will borrow more loans. The result of density test
is presented in ﬁgure 1.5. I do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms
of borrowing frequency between ﬁrms at the bottom of Russell 1000 index
and those at the top of Russell 2000 index.
1.5.3 Nonparametric form, bandwidth choice, and
placebo tests
In this section, I test whether the results using linear function form
are robust to diﬀerent nonparametric form or bandwidth choice. Overall,
results are qualitatively the same and suggest that IO only aﬀects the loan
spread but not the non-pricing contract terms. Results are shown in Table
1.6. Panel A presents the results using local polynomial speciﬁcation and
a third-degree polynomial with an Epanechnikov Kernel with a Rule of
Thumb (ROT) bandwidth suggested in Fan and Gijbels (1996). We also
test the results using 50% and 200% of the ROT bandwidth.
To demonstrate the signiﬁcance of the threshold of 1000th rank in this
RDD, in the falsiﬁcation tests, the same estimation technique is applied
to the 600th, 800th, 1200th, and 1400th ranks as thresholds. Results are
reported in Panel B of Table 1.6. These results demonstrate that there is no
signiﬁcant eﬀect at these random thresholds, which suggests that the main
results in this paper are not picking up a random pattern in the sample.
1.6 Conclusion
Over the past two decades, the syndicated loan market has become the
most important source of global corporate ﬁnancing. Factors that inﬂuence
the cost of bank loan are therefore of immense economic signiﬁcance.
In this paper, I explore an exogenous discontinuity in institutional own-
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ership and investigate the causal impact of institutional ownership on the
bank loan pricing. I ﬁnd that higher institutional ownership causes a de-
crease in loan spread but not in other non-pricing contract terms such as
collateral, maturity, or covenants. Moreover, this impact is weaker for fam-
ily ﬁrms. Further investigation reveals two potential channels of the casual
impact. First, the beneﬁt from monitoring eﬀort by institutional investors
is shared with debt holders. Second, the liquidity increase due to more
institutional investors involvement leads to the improvement in the corpo-
rate governance because the threat to monitor/exit" more reliable, and/or
lower credit risk. Overall, this paper suggests that institutional ownership
has a large causal impact on the cost of debt and the random inclusion in
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(a) Market Cap (b) Weight
Figure 1.1: Stocks around the Russell 1000 Inclusion Threshold
This ﬁgure shows the average stock market capitalization and index weights for
the ﬁrms around the Russell 1000 inclusion threshold at the end of June. Firms
are assigned to the Russell 1000 or 2000 based on the market capitalization of
ﬁrms at the end of each May. Index weights are determined by using a ﬂoat
adjusted market capitalization within each index at the end of each June.
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(a) Institutional Ownership (b) Institutional OwnershipTransient
(c) Institutional OwnershipDedicated (d) Institutional OwnershipQuasi-indexer
Figure 1.2: Discontinuity Test for Institutional Ownership Around Russell
1000 Inclusion Threshold
This ﬁgure plots the diﬀerent types of institutional ownership based on the trad-
ing pattern(e.g. transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer) against Russell size
rankings at the end of June across all years. The X axis represents the relative
distance from Russell 1000 inclusion threshold, with 0 represents the last ﬁrm in
Russell 1000. Each dot represents the average IO over 10 ranks.
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(a) Public Pension Fund (b) Bank Trust (c) Investment Company
(d) Insuance Company (e) Corporate Pension Fund (f) University and Foundation
Endowments
Figure 1.3: Discontinuity Test for Diﬀerent Legal Type of Institutional
Ownership
This ﬁgure plots the diﬀerent legal types of institutional ownership (e.g. pension
fund, investment company, ect.) against Russell size rankings at the end of June
across all years. The X axis represents the relative distance from Russell 1000
inclusion threshold, with 0 represents the last ﬁrm in Russell 1000. Each dot
represents the average IO over 10 ranks.
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(a) Loan Spread (b) Collateral (c) Maturity
(d) Financial Covenants (e) General Covenants (f) Total Covenants
Figure 1.4: Discontinuity Test for Bank Loan Contract Terms
This ﬁgure plots the diﬀerent contract terms of bank loans against Russell size
rankings at the end of June across all years. The X axis represents the relative
distance from Russell 1000 inclusion threshold, with 0 represents the last ﬁrm in
Russell 1000. Each dot represents the average contract terms over 10 ranks.
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Figure 1.5: Density Test for Bank Loan Borrowing
This ﬁgure plots the frequency of bank loan borrowing against Russell size rank-
ings at the end of June across all years. The X axis represents the relative
distance from Russell 1000 inclusion threshold, with 0 represents the last ﬁrm in
Russell 1000.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for ﬁrms around 1000th rank
This table presents the summary statistics for the bottom 100 ﬁrms in Russell
1000 index (Panel A) and the top 100 ﬁrms in Russell 2000 index (Panel B).
Market Cap is CRSP Price (PRC) multiplied by shares outstanding (SHROUT).
Institutional Ownership is Thomson 13F Shares Held summed across all insti-
tutions scaled by CRSP shares outstanding (SHROUT). Expected Default Fre-
quency is the Distance-to-Default measure using Merton model. Book to Market
is book value of equity divided by Market value of equity (PRCC x CSHPRI).
Leverage is Compustat Total Debt (DLC + DLTT) scaled by Total Asset. Tan-
gibility is the Ratio of Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPE) to total assets.
Proﬁtability is the operating margin, calculated as ratio of EBITDA to sales.
ROA is Net Income scaled by total assets.
Panel A: Russell 1000
Mean P25 Median P75 Std.
Market Cap 1336.60 680.30 1154.40 1781.60 877.50
Institutional Ownership 0.45 0.22 0.42 0.65 0.27
Expected Default Frequency 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
Book to Market 0.74 0.21 0.41 0.85 0.88
Leverage 0.44 0.25 0.40 0.61 0.25
Tangibility 0.29 0.08 0.22 0.44 0.25
Proﬁtability 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.14
ROA 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.11
Panel B: Russell 2000
Mean P25 Median P75 Std.
Market Cap 1129.60 672.30 1163.40 1504.50 512.40
Institutional Ownership 0.63 0.46 0.66 0.82 0.26
Expected Default Frequency 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08
Book to Market 0.80 0.29 0.59 1.17 0.69
Leverage 0.46 0.27 0.45 0.60 0.24
Tangibility 0.30 0.07 0.23 0.46 0.27
Proﬁtability 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.19 0.14
ROA 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.11
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Table 1.2: Discontinuity test for bank loan contract terms
This table presents the discontinuity test for bank loan contract terms and in-
stitutional ownership. IO is the institutional ownership of stocks. Spread is the
all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread
over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis
points. Maturity is the duration (in months) between facility activation date
and maturity date. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan was
secured and 0 otherwise. Covenants is the total number of ﬁnancial and general
covenants in the loan facility. EDF is the expected default frequency which is
a distance-to-default measure using Merton model. The test results are from
estimating the following regression around the Russell 1000 exclusion/inclusion
cutoﬀ point:
Y = α+ β1 ∗R2000 + β2 ∗ |Rank|+ β3 ∗ |Rank| ∗R2000 + Y eari + , (1.3)
where for |Rank| < 101, R2000 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the stocks
are in Russell 2000 index, Rank is the relative rank against the 1000th rank which
is Russell 1000 exclusion/inclusion cutoﬀ point, and Y eari are the year dummies.
I use the OLS for spread and maturity regression, Logit regression for collateral,
and Poisson regression for covenant. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
(*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the
10% level).
IO Spread Maturity Collateral Covenants EDF
R2000 0.350*** -28.9*** -0.870 0.000 0.053 -0.05***
(0.023) (11.300) (3.050) (0.220) (0.051) (0.013)
Rank 0.003*** -0.260* 0.059* 0.007*** 0.002*** -0.000**
(0.001) (0.130) (0.036) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000)
R2000*Rank -0.01*** 0.360* -0.001 -0.002 -0.002** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.190) (0.050) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
N 1862 1559 1698 1865 1865 1587
Adj. R-sq 0.350 0.056 0.053 0.094
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.3: Regression results using switchers
This table presents the discontinuity test for bank loan contract terms. Spread
is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon
spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported
in basis points. Maturity is the duration (in months) between facility activation
date and maturity date. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
loan was secured and 0 otherwise. Covenants is the total number of ﬁnancial
and general covenants in the loan facility. The test results are from estimating
the following regression for the ﬁrms switching between Russell 1000 index and
Russell 2000 index. Only the switching year and the year before switching are
included in the sample:
Y = α+ β1 ∗R2000 + Y eari + Firmi + , (1.4)
where R2000 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the stocks are in Russell 2000
index, Firmi are the ﬁrm dummies, and Y eari are the year dummies. I use
the OLS for spread and maturity regression, logit regression for collateral, and
Poisson regression for covenant. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors (***
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10%
level).
Spread Maturity Collateral Covenants
R2000 -43.40* -1.00 -0.14 0.20
(25.70) (5.78) (0.45) (0.16)
N 184 221 221 201
Adj. R-sq 0.39 0.40
Pseudo R-sq 0.15
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 1.4: Cross section results
This table presents the cross-sectional results of the discontinuity tests. IO is
the institutional ownership of stocks. Spread is the all-inclusive cost of a drawn
loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon spread over LIBOR on the drawn
amount plus the annual fee and is reported in basis points. Distress_high is a
dummy that equals 1 if the EDF of ﬁrms is above the median. Family ﬁrm is
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the ﬁrm has more than 5% family ownership.
The test results are from estimating the following regression around the Russell
1000 exclusion/inclusion cutoﬀ point:
Y = α+ β1 ∗R2000 + β2 ∗ |Rank|+ β3 ∗ |Rank| ∗R2000 + Y eari + , (1.5)
where for |Rank| < 101, R2000 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the stocks
are in Russell 2000 index, Rank is the relative rank from the 1000th rank which
is Russell 1000 exclusion/inclusion cutoﬀ point, and Y eari are the year dummies.
I use the OLS for spread regression. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors








R2000 X Distress_High -12.20
(22.90)
R2000 X Family ﬁrm 134.10**
(58.10)




R2000 X Rank 0.08 1.26**
(0.26) (0.49)
Distress_High X Rank -0.02
(0.26)
R2000 X Distress_High X Rank 0.24
(0.38)
R2000 X Family ﬁrm X Rank -1.47
(0.93)
N 1554 430
Adj. R-sq 0.08 0.12
Test R2000+R2000 X Distress_high=0 (F-value) 3.10*
Test R2000+R2000 X Family ﬁrm=0 (F-value) 0.32
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Table 1.5: Potential channels
This table presents the results for testing the potential channels through which
institutional ownership aﬀects bank loan pricing. Illiquidity is the one-year-
forward monthly average of the log(Amihud illquidity measure). Proxy voting
rate is the proxy voting participation rate from ISS Risk Metrics Shareholder
Proposal and Vote Results database. The test results are from estimating the
following regression around the Russell 1000 exclusion/inclusion cutoﬀ point:
Y = α+ β1 ∗R2000 + β2 ∗ |Rank|+ β3 ∗ |Rank| ∗R2000 + Y eari + , (1.6)
where for |Rank| < 101, R2000 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the stocks
are in Russell 2000 index, Rank is the relative rank from the 1000th rank which
is Russell 1000 exclusion/inclusion cutoﬀ point, and Y eari are the year dummies.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors (*** signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10% level).





R2000 X Rank 0.012*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.001)
N 1220 1220
Adj. R-sq 0.690 0.450
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Table 1.6: Robustness check
This table presents the robustness test for bank loan contract terms. Spread is
the all-inclusive cost of a drawn loan to the borrower. This equals the coupon
spread over LIBOR on the drawn amount plus the annual fee and is reported in
basis points. Maturity is the duration (in months) between facility activation date
and maturity date. Collateral is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan was
secured and 0 otherwise. Covenants is the total number of ﬁnancial and general
covenants in the loan facility. Panel A reports the tests using nonparametric
form and diﬀerent bandwidth choices. The test results are from ﬁtting a third
degree polynomial estimate to the left and to the right of the Russell 1000/2000
threshold. The Rule of Thumb (ROT) bandwidth is suggested in Fan and Gijbels
(1996). Panel B reports the placebo tests using 600th, 800th, 1200th, and 1400th
ranks as the cutoﬀ points. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors (***
signiﬁcant at the 1% level, ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level, * signiﬁcant at the 10%
level).
Panel A: Nonparametric form and diﬀerent bandwidth
ROT
Bandwidth(83)
50% Bandwidth 200% Bandwidth
Spread -20.10** -12.65** -23.86*
Collateral 0.10 0.09 0.02
Maturity 2.08 8.49 1.87
Covenant 0.21 0.02 0.86
Panel B: Placebo tests using diﬀerent rank as cutoﬀ point




R2000 -11.90 -11.50 3.10 22.50
(9.39) (8.78) (9.82) (21.60)
Rank -0.22** -0.31*** 0.13 0.46***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
R2000 X Rank 0.08 0.42*** 0.20 -0.31
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.20)
N 1981 1763 1478 1501






in Corporate Credit Rating
1
2.1 Introduction
Credit ratings play a signiﬁcant and increasingly important role in bor-
rowers' access to capital and in federal and state legislation. Despite their
central role in the ﬁnancial market, credit rating agencies (hereafter CRAs)
have been confronted with continuing criticism regarding the quality of
their ratings. Since CRAs collect fees from issuers that they rate instead
of the end users of credit ratings such as investors, CRAs have incentive
to inﬂate the rating to please the issuers. Thus, CRAs face the trade-oﬀ
between the short-term proﬁts from inﬂating the ratings and the long-
1I would like to thank National University of Singapore, Humanities and Social Sci-
ences Research Fund R-315-000-104-646, for ﬁnancial support for this project.
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term reputation loss. On one hand, some papers (Klein and Leer (1981);
Shapiro (1983)) argue that reputation concerns should discourage CRAs
from engaging in rating inﬂation. On the other hand, some theoretical pa-
pers suggest that CRAs may intentionally inﬂate or deﬂate the rating. For
example, Faure-Grimaud, Peyrache, and Quesada (2009) show that issuers
may prefer to suppress their ratings if the information content of the rating
is too noisy. They also ﬁnd that competition between rating agencies can
result in less information disclosure. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012)
model the competition among CRAs and suggest that ratings are more
likely to be inﬂated during booms and when investors are more trusting.
The conﬂict of theoretical predictions raises an interesting but empirically
challenging question: Do credit rating agencies intentionally misreport (in-
ﬂate/deﬂate) ratings and, if yes, what is the pattern?
In this paper, we investigate the likelihood and magnitude of intentional
misreporting behavior in corporate ratings. Misreporting is deﬁned as an
intentional deviation of the reported rating relative to the internal ratings
of the borrower that is free from any conﬂicts of interest. In the context
of this paper, we consider inﬂation as well as deﬂation as misreporting in
our paper. 2 This is an empirically challenging problem as we do not
have access to the internal rating given by the CRA, only the externally
reported ratings. Further complicating this is the fact that the internal
rating may also diﬀer from the true rating, deﬁned as the ratings that the
obligor would obtain in the absence of any inﬂation or deﬂation, as well as
in the absence of any assessment error on the part of the CRA.
Our main contribution is that we propose a latent variable approach to
infer the misreporting behavior of CRAs. Speciﬁcally, we treat the reported
corporate credit rating as a function of the underlying unobserved true
credit rating. We then impose a structure on the assessment and reporting
2For example, if the internal rating is AA and reported rating is AAA, the reported
rating is inﬂated; if the reported ratings is A, the reported rating is deﬂated.
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process and the dynamics of the underlying latent true credit rating. We
then identify two sources of diﬀerence between the true rating and the
reported rating by CRAs. The ﬁrst source is the "mis-assessment", which is
the noise from the unobservable true rating to the rating perceived by CRAs
(the internal rating). This is because the CRAs may not 100% accurately
infer the true quality of the ﬁrms. The second source is "misreporting",
which is the diﬀerence between the rating perceived by CRAs and the rating
reported by CRAs.
Using a sample of corporate credit ratings during 1986-2011, we ﬁnd
that there is a U-shaped relationship between true credit rating and mis-
reporting probability. Speciﬁcally, CRAs misreport the credit ratings for
high-grade ﬁrms with a probability of 3%, for middle-grade ﬁrms with a
probability of 0, and for low-grade ﬁrms with a probability of 6%. Under-
standing the properties of misreporting behavior is important, given that
credit ratings play a signiﬁcant and increasingly important role in borrow-
ers' access to capital and in federal and state legislation. Since we do not
observe the true rating, we can not compare it with reported rating by
CRAs and directly assess the misreporting probability. Our result implies
that, using reported rating directly may understate the downward risk in
the low rating grade.
Second, we investigate the heterogeneity of the misreporting behavior
across diﬀerent industries. We ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial industry has highest
misreporting probability (35% in the lowest rating group) and misreporting
magnitude (rating grade jump between true and reported grade) and energy
industry has lowest misreporting probability. Altman and Kao (1992) and
Bangia, Diebold, Kronimus, Schagen, and Schuermann (2002) document
that rating transition matrices vary with the industries of obligor. This
eﬀect would be due to the diﬀerent incentive in misreporting the rating
across industries. Those industries which have larger number of issuance
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would be more attractive to the CRAs. In order to get the rating deals,
CRAs may have higher incentive to inﬂate the rating. Although our result
do not directly answer this question, we document a signiﬁcant industry
heterogeneity in misreporting behaviors of CRAs.
Third, we investigate the heterogeneity of the misreporting behavior in
diﬀerent stages of business cycle. When the economic condition is good,
the credit agent is more likely and heavily to inﬂate the rating. Nickell,
Perraudin, and Varotto (2000) identify the incremental impact of indus-
try, domicile, and stage of the business cycle on the distribution of ratings
changes. Our paper suggest that, at least partially, the misreporting be-
havior may count for the observed changing in distribution of rating in
diﬀerent stages of business cycle.
Last, the CRAs in general have quite small mis-assessments. In most
of cases, the mis-assessments is not statistically diﬀerence from 0 for all
the rating grades except the rating worse than "B" rating. This is not
surprising given that CRAs have been in corporate rating area for decades
and they have ample of experience in this industry.
Our study contributes to the credit rating accuracy literature. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to explicitly examine the likelihood and
magnitude of the misreporting in corporate credit rating and separate it out
from "mis-assessment". Prior literature tends to use some speciﬁc events to
evaluate their impact on rating quality. For example, Becker and Milbourn
(2011) documents a negative association between rating quality and the
entry of a third rating agency-Fitch. This ﬁnding suggests that competition
in the ratings industry may reduce the incumbents' future economics rents,
and thereby, weaken reputation incentives for quality provision. Xia (2012)
ﬁnds a signiﬁcant improvement in the quality of S&P's ratings following
rating initiation of Egan-Jone Rating Company which is an investor-paid
rating agency. One exception is Griﬃn and Tang (2012) which use the
38
output of a leading CRA's main quantitative model. They ﬁnd that a top
credit rating agency frequently made positive adjustment beyond its main
model for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In this paper, we impose
the structure of the rating change and we are able to use the whole rating
sample and then directly estimate the misreporting probability.
Our work is also related to literature that examines the transition of
credit ratings. Altman and Kao (1992) and Bangia et al. (2002) document
that rating transition matrices vary with the stages of the business cycle,
the industries of obligor and the length of time that has elapsed since the
bond issuance. Frydman and Schuermann (2008) propose a parsimonious
model that is a mixture of two Markov chains. While all these papers are
based on the reported ratings to calculate the transition probability of the
credit rating, our paper explicitly models the misreporting behavior and
estimate the underlying transition probability matrix. We also allow the
misreporting behavior and the underlying transition probability matrix of
credit ratings to be diﬀerent across industry and business cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides the-
oretical results on the identiﬁcation and estimation of the misreporting
probabilities, mis-assessment of CRAs, and the marginal distribution of
the underlying credit rating. Section .1 reports the result for testing the
consistency of the estimators proposed using simulation. Section 2.3 illus-
trates the data structure. Section 2.4 presents our main empirical results on
the estimated misreporting probabilities and the corrected rating category
distribution. The last section concludes. 3.
3More robustness check on the validity of this method is available upon request
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2.2 A closed-form identiﬁcation and estima-
tion
In this section, we presents a closed-form identiﬁcation and estimation
procedure for the misreporting and mis-assessment distributions. The key
idea is to use reported ratings across periods to identify the total error
and the transition matrices. Then we use rating outlooks as an IV to
identify the misreporting matrix. Note that the total error is a mixture of
mis-assessment and misreporting. The identiﬁcation of the mis-assessment
matrix then follows as the latter two are identiﬁed.
2.2.1 Model setup
Let R∗t denote the latent true rating at period t. The CRAs may not
100% accurately infer the true quality of the ﬁrms. Therefore, the CRA
perceive a internal rating r∗t , which is the true rating R
∗
t plus some error
which we denote as "mis-assessment". After CRAs observe the internal
rating r∗t , they decide to report the rating rt. The diﬀerence between the
perceived rating and reported rating by CRAs is denoted as the "misre-
porting". Figure 2.1 demonstrates the model setup.
[Figure 2.1 about here]
2.2.2 Assumptions and identiﬁcation
This section presents the identiﬁcation strategy and provides detail eco-
nomic intuition behind each assumption. Mis-assessment and misreporting
can be separately and uniquely identiﬁed if the assumptions provided are
satisﬁed.
Assumption 1 Conditional on ﬁrms' characteristics X and current true
rating R∗t , the ratings that are more than one year ago, beyond the current
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credit rating, has no predictive power over the true rating in the next year:
Pr(R∗t+12|R∗t , R∗t−12, X) = Pr(R∗t+12|R∗t , X), for all t.
The intuition is that credit ratings convey the entity's future debt pay-
ing quality based on current information. It does not depend on the his-
torical ratings. This is easy to verify based on the deﬁnition of the credit
ratings. The deﬁnition of credit ratings in S&P website4 says that "Credit
ratings are forward-looking opinions about credit risk. Standard & Poor's
credit ratings express the agency's opinion about the ability and willingness
of an issuer, such as a corporation or state or city government, to meet its
ﬁnancial obligations in full and on time." The reason we choose 12 months
lag is based on the fact that CRAs normally reevaluate the rating once a
year unless signiﬁcant corporate events occur, such as merger and acquisi-
tion. We use data one year apart to mitigate the inﬂuence of past reported
rating on future reported rating when conditional on observed rating. This
is to alleviate the concern of time series correlation of the reported ratings.
Therefore, our model allow the autocorrelation between credit rating to be
up to 11 time steps.
Assumption 2 Conditional on the ﬁrms' characteristics X, the distribu-
tion of the rating that the agency observes only depends on current true
underlying status: Pr(r∗t |R∗t , X, r∗6=t, R∗6=t) = Pr(r∗t |R∗t , X) for all t.
This assumption implies past or future true ratings does not play a role
in the mis-assessment distribution during the information obtaining pro-
cess, given the current true rating. The latent true rating and ﬁrms' char-
acteristics together determine the mis-assessment distribution. In other
words, mis-assessment distributions are independent when conditional on
the true rating, but they are allowed to be diﬀerent for each rating category.
4http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/deﬁnitions-and-faqs/en/us
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Assumption 3 Conditional on the ﬁrms' characteristics X, the misre-
porting distribution only depends on the status that the agency observes:
Pr(rt|R∗t , r∗t , X,R∗6=t, r∗6=t) = Pr(rt|r∗t , X) for all t.
This assumption implies that past or future perceiving ratings and re-
ported ratings do not matter when CRAs report the rating conditional on
current observing rating. The perceiving rating and ﬁrms' characteristics
together determine the reported rating. In other words, the reporting be-
havior in each period is uncorrelated. We allow the misreporting behavior
to depend on the perceiving rating status, saying the misreporting distri-
bution could be diﬀerent for each rating category.
Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, we can associate the observed joint rating
distribution rt+12, rt, rt−12 with the total error (mis-assessment plus misre-
porting) distribution through following:



















pr(rt+12|r∗t+12, X)pr(r∗t+12|R∗t+12, X)pr(R∗t+12|R∗t , X)pr(rt|r∗t , X)
pr(r∗t |R∗t , X)pr(rt−12|r∗t−12, X)pr(r∗t−12|R∗t−12, X)pr(r∗t , R∗t−12|X)
=
∑
pr(rt|R∗t , X)pr(rt+12|R∗t , X)pr(R∗t , rt−12, X)
sum over rt+12, we then have
pr(rt, rt−12|X) =
∑
pr(rt|R∗t , X)pr(R∗t , rt−12|X)
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Following the identiﬁcation results in Hu (2008) we show that identiﬁ-
cation of the total error distribution (Pr(rt|R∗t , X)) is feasible. In order to
apply this novel method, we introduce matrix notation.
For any given subgroup with ﬁrm characteristics X=x, and ﬁx the future




Pr(rt = 1|R∗t = 1, X = x) Pr(rt = 1|R∗t = 2, X = x) ... P r(rt = 1|R∗t = K,X = x)
Pr(rt = 2|R∗t = 1, X = x) Pr(rt = 2|R∗t = 2, X = x) ... P r(rt = 2|R∗t = K,X = x)
. . . .




Pr(rt = 1, r
∗
t−12 = 1|X = x) ... ... P r(rt = 1, r∗t−12 = K|X = x)
Pr(rt = 2, r
∗
t−12 = 1|X = x) ... ... P r(rt = 2, r∗t−12 = K|X = x)
. . . .
P r(rt = K, r
∗




Pr(R∗t = 1, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... ... P r(R∗t = 1, rt−12 = K|X = x)
Pr(R∗t = 2, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... ... P r(R∗t = 2, rt−12 = K|X = x)
. . . .




Pr(rt+12 = k, rt = 1, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... P r(rt+12 = k, rt = 1, rt−12 = K|X = x)
Pr(rt+12 = k, rt = 2, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... P r(rt+12 = k, rt = 2, rt−12 = K|X = x)
. . .





Pr(rt+12 = k|R∗t = 1, X = x) 0 ... 0
0 Pr(rt+12 = k|R∗t = 2, X = x) ... 0
0 0 ... 0
0 0 ... P r(rt+12 = k|R∗t = K,X = x)

Consequently, we can obtain the following two equation in matrix form:
Pk,rt,rt−12|x = Prt|R∗t ,xDk|R∗,xPR∗t ,rt−12|x (2.1)
and
Prt,rt−12|x = Prt|R∗t ,xPR∗t ,rt−12|x (2.2)
In order to identify the total error through equations 2.1 and 2.2, we need to
impose following assumptions:
Assumption 4 for any X = x, the matrix Prt,rt−12|x is invertible.
This assumption is imposed on the observed density Prt,rt−12|x, and therefore,
is directly testable from the data. Given this condition, the matrices Prt|R∗t ,x,
and PR∗t ,rt−12|x are both invertible. Consequently, post multiplying P
−1
rt,rt−12|x to
equation 2.1 leads to the following key identiﬁcation equation:
Pk,rt,rt−12|xP
−1
rt,rt−12|x = Prt|R∗t ,xDk|R∗t ,xP
−1
rt|R∗t ,x (2.3)
The matrix on the left-hand-side can be formed from the observed data. Since
Dk|R∗,x is a diagonal matrix, the matrix on the right-hand size represents an
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the left-hand-side matrix, with Dk|R∗,x
as the diagonal matrix consisted of eigenvalues, and Prt|R∗t ,x as the matrix of
eigenvectors correspondingly. The normalization on Prt|R∗t ,x is given by the fact
that every column in Prt|R∗t ,x should be added up to one because of probability
theory. Uniqueness of this decomposition requires the eigenvalues to be distinc-
tive, hence we assume
Assumption 5 For any X = x and every future reported rating rt+12 = k,
rating agency reports diﬀerent latent true rating k with diﬀerent probabilities.
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i.e., Pr(rt+12 = k|R∗t = i,X = x) are diﬀerent for diﬀerent i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}
Assumption 5 is also testable from equation 2.3 because they are the eigen-
values of the observed matrix Pk,rt,rt−12|xP
−1
rt,rt−12|x.
The distinct eigenvalues guarantee the uniqueness of the eigenvectors. Since
we do not observe the R∗t in the sample, we need to reveal the value R∗t for
each eigenvector Pr(rt|R∗t = r∗t , X = x). In other words, the ordering of the
eigenvalues or the eigenvectors is still arbitrary in equation 2.3. In order to
eliminate this ambiguity, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 6 For any x, the rating agency is more likely to report the true
rating grater than to report any other possible ratings, i.e.
Pr(rt = i|R∗t = i, x) > Pr(rt = j|R∗t = i, x) for j 6= i
Although this assumption does not reveal the value of these reporting proba-
bilities, nor require the probability of reporting the truth to be larger than 50%,
given that the credit rating is widely used in trading and regulation requirement,
we believe that the truly reporting probabilities is larger than 50 % and there-
fore it is nature to make this assumption. This assumption provides an ordering
of the eigenvectors and the eigenvalues in equation 2.3. Therefore, it leads to
a unique decomposition. Thus, the total error distribution matrix Prt|R∗t ,x is
uniquely determined from the observed matrices Pk,rt,rt−12|x and Prt,rt−12|x.
Above ﬁrst step identiﬁcation provides us the total error distribution ma-
trix, which is the combination of the mis-assessment distribution and reported
behavior.




t |R∗t , X)
=
∑
pr(rt|r∗t , X)pr(Rt|R∗t , X)
for every type of ﬁrms(X = x), we can represent the correlation between
total error distribution, mis-assessment distribution that aﬀecting what grade
the agent observes, and the misreporting behavior of the agent into following
matrix:





Pr(rt = 1|r∗t = 1, X = x) ... ... P r(rt = 1|r∗t = K,X = x)
Pr(rt = 2|r∗t = 1, X = x) ... ... P r(rt = 2|r∗t = K,X = x)
. . . .
P r(rt = K|r∗t = 1, X = x) ... ... P r(rt = K|r∗t = K,X = x)

Pr∗t |R∗t ,x ≡

Pr(r∗t = 1|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... ... P r(r∗t = 1|R∗t = K,X = x)
Pr(r∗t = 2|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... ... P r(r∗t = 2|R∗t = K,X = x)
. . . .
P r(r∗t = K|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... ... P r(r∗t = K|R∗t = K,X = x)

which indicates separating the mis-assessment distribution and reported be-
havior requires more information. Following illustrates how to identify misre-
ported probability using additional information. After rating agency perceive
the rating status Rt, which is the true status with noise, the agency not only
reports the rating, but also provides extra information, rating outlook denoted
as wt, we can separately identify the misreport behavior as follows. The rat-
ing outlook is classiﬁed as positive, stable, and negative, which we assign value
wt=+1,0,-1, respectively. We state the assumption below:
Assumption 7 Conditional on ﬁrms characteristics (X) and what the agency
perceives (r∗t ), the reporting rating rt and rating outlook wt are independent, i.e.
Pr(rt, wt|r∗t , X) = Pr(rt|r∗t , X)Pr(wt|r∗t , X)
This assumption basically means conditional on the perceived rating grade,
the probability that agents report the grade to be rt should be the same whether
it reports the rating outlook to be positive, negative or zero. This conditional
independence of rating and rating outlook help for backing out the misreported
behavior of the agency. Here we do not require the agent report the true rating
outlook status.
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By law of total probability, again we can use the joint distribution of
wt, rt, rt−12|X to identify the agent's misreported behavior
pr(wt, rt, rt−12|X) =
∑
pr(wt, rt, rt−12, Rt|X)
=
∑
pr(rt|r∗t , X)pr(wt|r∗t , X)prob(r∗t , rt−12|X)
sum over wt provides us
pr(rt, rt−12|X) =
∑
pr(rt|r∗t , X)prob(r∗t , rt−12|X)
for ﬁrms with characteristics X = x and a typical rating outlook wt = w,
matrix representation of these two equations can be written as follows:
Pw,rt,rt−12|x = Prt|r∗t ,xDwt|r∗t ,xPr∗t ,rt−12|x




Pr(wt = w, rt = 1, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... P r(wt = w, rt = 1, rt−12 = K|X = x)
Pr(wt = w, rt = 2, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... P r(wt = w, rt = 2, rt−12 = K|X = x)
. . .




Pr(wt = k|r∗t = 1, X = x) 0 ... 0
0 Pr(wt = k|r∗t = 2, X = x) ... 0
0 0 ... 0





Pr(r∗t = 1, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... P r(r∗t = 1, rt−12 = K|X = x)
Pr(r∗t = 2, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... P r(r∗t = 2, rt−12 = K|X = x)
. . .
P r(r∗t = K, rt−12 = 1|X = x) ... P r(r∗t = K, rt−12 = K|X = x)

Given that we have already imposed the invertibility of matrix Prt,rt−12 in the




rt,rt−12|x = Prt|r∗t ,xDwt|r∗t ,xP
−1
rt|r∗t ,x (2.4)
The matrix on the left-hand-side can be formed from the observed data.
Since Dwt|r∗t ,x is a diagonal matrix, the matrix on the right-hand size repre-
sents an eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the left-hand-side matrix, with
Dwt|r∗t ,x as the diagonal matrix consisted of eigenvalues, and Prt|r∗t ,x as the ma-
trix of eigenvectors correspondingly. The normalization on Prt|r∗t ,x is given by
the fact that every column in Prt|r∗t ,x should be added up to one because of prob-
ability theory. Uniqueness of this decomposition requires the eigenvalues to be
distinctive, hence we assume
Assumption 8 In each period, conditional on ﬁrms characteristics X = x and
what the rating agency perceives, the probability that it reports the rating outlook
to be positive varies with r∗t . i.e., Pr(wt = +1|r∗t = i, x) varies for diﬀerent
r∗t = i ∈ {1, 2, ...,K}
Assumption 8 is also testable from equation 2.4 because they are the eigen-
values of the observed matrix Pwt,rt,rt−12|xP
−1
rt,rt−12|x.
Ordering of the eigenvalue requires additional assumption stated as follow:
Assumption 9 The rating agency is more likely to report the rating it perceives
than to report any other possible ratings, i.e.
Pr(rt = i|r∗t = i, x) > Pr(rt = j|r∗t = i, x) for j 6= i
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Although this assumption does not reveal the value of these reporting proba-
bilities, not require the probability of reporting the truth to be larger than 50%,
given that the credit rating is widely used in trading and regulation requirement,
we believe that the truly reporting probabilities is larger than 50 % and there-
fore it is nature to make this assumption. This assumption provides an ordering
of the eigenvectors and the eigenvalues in equation 2.3. Therefore, it leads to a
unique decomposition. Thus, the total error distribution matrix Prt|r∗t is uniquely
determined from the observed matrices Pwt=1,rt,rt−12|x and Prt,rt−12|x.
We summarize the identiﬁcation results as follows:
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 the observed joint
distribution of the reported rating Pr(rt+12, rt, rt−12|x) and Pr(wt, rt, rt−12|x)
uniquely identify the misreporting matrix Pr(rt|r∗t , x) and mis-assessment matrix
Pr(r∗t |R∗t , x), respectively.
Proof. The theorem is easily proved using Theorem 1 in Hu (2008).
Since our identiﬁcation results are constructive, we can directly follow the
identiﬁcation procedure to form an estimator. Speciﬁcally, we may estimate
Pr(rt+12, rt, rt−12|x), Pr(rt, rt−12|x) and Pr(wt, rt, rt−12|x) using sample average
for a discrete x = x. For a continuous x, we may simply use a kernel density
estimator 5.
Following the identiﬁcation procedure, we may estimate the misreporting
probability Pr(rt|r∗t , x) and the mis-assessment distribution Pr(r∗t |R∗t , x). Such
an estimator has a closed-form expression so that one does not need to use the
regular optimization algorithms, which usually need many iterations.
The total error distribution enables us to obtain the distribution of the latent




Pr(rt|R∗t , X)Pr(R∗t |X) (2.5)
















P r(R∗t = K|X)

Consequently, inverting the error distribution matrix and the observed cred-














P r(rt = K|X)

Moreover, we can also estimate the probability that when some companies
with characteristics X reported by the rating agency as rating rt but the true
rating is actually R∗t through Bayesian equation:
Pr(R∗t |rt, X) =
Pr(rt|R∗t , X)Pr(R∗t |X)∑
R∗t
Pr(rt|R∗t , X)Pr(R∗t |X)
(2.6)
Additionally, the transition matrix for latent credit rating can be obtained
through following matrix transformation.













prob(rt+12|R∗t+12, X)prob(R∗t+12|R∗t , X) (2.7)
where prob(rt+12|R∗t , X) is the eigenvalues from matrix decomposition in the ﬁrst
step. Moreover, we assume stationary environment indicating prob(rt+12|R∗t+12, X) =
50
prob(rt|R∗t , X), which is the eigenvector from matrix decomposition in the ﬁrst
step too. Hence, we can obtain the transition distribution again with aid of
matrix representation.




Pr(rt+12 = 1|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... P r(rt+12 = 1|R∗t = K,X = x)
Pr(rt+12 = 2|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... P r(rt+12 = 2|R∗t = K,X = x)
. . . .




Pr(rt+12 = 1|R∗t+12 = 1, X = x) ... P r(rt+12 = 1|R∗t+12 = K,X = x)
Pr(rt+12 = 2|R∗t+12 = 1, X = x) ... P r(rt+12 = 2|R∗t+12 = K,X = x)
. . . .




Pr(R∗t+12 = 1|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... P r(R∗t+12 = 1|R∗t = K,X = x)
Pr(R∗t+12 = 2|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... P r(R∗t+12 = 2|R∗t = K,X = x)
. . . .
P r(R∗t+12 = K|R∗t = 1, X = x) ... P r(R∗t+12 = K|R∗t = K,X = x)

The total error distribution matrix is invertible from assumption 4. Conse-
quently, the latent grade transition distribution can be identiﬁed through:






2.3 Data and sample description
We construct our rating sample directly from COMPUSTAT North America
ratings and RatingsXpress. This database contains detailed information on S&P
credit ratings back to 19866. We focus on the long-term rating of the companies
from 1986 to 2011, because the long-term ratings measure the forward-looking
long-term ability to meet the ﬁnancial obligation and therefore more suitable
for our assumption on the stability of transition matrix of ratings. We use Rat-
ingsXpress to obtain the rating outlook information. We use the monthly data of
the ratings. Following prior literature, missing credit rating/outlook is replaced
using rating/outlook in the previous month.
We exclude the ratings with "NM" (Not Meaningful), "Suspend", "SD" (i.e.
ﬁrms have selectively defaulted on some obligations), "D" (i.e. ﬁrms has defaulted
on some obligations and S&P believes that it will generally default on most or
all obligations), and "NR" (not rated), because these ratings based on some
observable facts to the public thus these is no room to misreport it. There are 21
diﬀerent levels of rating by the rating agency and we group them into 6 categories:
All the AAA level rating to be category 1; all the AA level rating to be category
2; All the A level rating to be category 3; category 4 includes all the triple B
rating, i.e BBB+, BBB,BBB-; category 5 includes all the double B rating, i.e
BB+, BB,BB-; and category 6 consists of all rating left. Panel A of table 2.1
presents descriptive statistics for ﬁrms rated by S&P between 1986 and 2011.
[Table 2.1 about here]
Firstly, we calculate 1-year unconditional transition matrices using reported
ratings. This permit us to relate our results to earlier studies that have performed
similar exercises. The basic assumption of this approach is that, for a given sam-
ple, the probability of a transition from rating i to j, say, is a constant parameter,
pij . This amounts to saying that, for a given initial rating, transitions to diﬀer-
ent possible future ratings follow a constant parameter, temporally independent
6Although the dataset has data starting from 1973, there is very few observation
prior to 1986.
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multinomial process. Estimation may then be performed by taking the fraction
of occasions in the sample (or sub-sample) on which an obliger starts the year
in state i and end it in j. Result is reported in Panel A of Table 2.2. The table
should be read as follow: row variable is the current rating and column variable
is the rating 12 months later, so the cellij represents the transition probability
to the rating j 12 month later given the current rating is i. For example, the ﬁrst
row and ﬁrst column in panel A says that, given the current rating is AAA, the
ﬁrm stays as AAA with a probability of 90.05%. Our result is quite comparable
to that in previous literature (Nickell et al. (2000) ).
Secondly, diﬀerent from previous literature, we estimate the transition proba-
bility matrix after correcting for the misreporting and mis-assessment. As Figure
2.1 demonstrates, after CRAs learn the true rating of the ﬁrms, they impose a
consistent misreporting probability for each rating groups deﬁned above. Then
CRAs report the after-adjustment rating. Using the estimation method in Sec-
tion 2.2, Table 2.2 panel B reports the results. Comparing panel A and panel
B, we can ﬁnd that the reported transition matrix underestimate the probability
of retaining the same rating in 12 months. All the diagonal cells in reported
matrix (panel A) are smaller than that in panel B. This is not surprise because
the transition probability using reported rating neglect the mis-assessment and
misreporting. Therefore, these 2 error components contribute to more observed
status shifting. Second, the reported transition matrix (panel A) has higher tran-
sition probability from higher rating group (AAA, AA, and A) to lower rating
groups than that in estimated transition (panel B). Third, the reported transi-
tion matrix (panel A) has higher transition probability from lower rating group
(BBB, BB&B, and Below B) to higher rating groups than that in estimated tran-
sition matrix (panel B). Overall, the reported transition matrix overestimate the
probability of credit rating upgrade for low rating groups and underestimate that
for high rating groups.
[Table 2.2 about here]
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2.4 Empirical result
This section estimates the misreporting matrix using observed rating data.
We ﬁrst pool all of the data together and estimate the overall misreportings;
we then incorporate ﬁrm attributes such as industry, business cycle into the
misreporting probability estimation and look into how rating agency behaves
diﬀerently.
2.4.1 Misreporting behavior in overall sample
We pool the monthly rating data from 1986 to 2011. In order to build up
a consistent sample with that in subsample analysis, we merge the rating data
with COMPUSTAT with requirement that the industry information is available 7.
We use the credit watch/rating outlook 8 as additional information besides rating
itself to separate out mis-assessment and misreporting. The untabulated result
indicates that the mis-assessment is quite small and statistically insigniﬁcant in
both overall sample and subsample analysis. Therefore, in the following analysis,
we take the 0 mis-assessment as the fact and conduct our analysis on misreporting
behavior of CRAs.
2.4.2 Misreporting behavior in overall sample
Table 2.3 presents the misreporting matrix for the whole sample. The diago-
nal of matrix stands for the trustfully reporting probability and the cells in upper
triangle stand for the inﬂation probability. The cells in lower triable stand for the
deﬂation probability. We sum up the inﬂation probability and deﬂation probabil-
ity as misreporting probability (not truthfully reporting). We ﬁnd that, overall,
the rating inﬂation is not that serve in the whole sample, comparing to that
in structured ﬁnanced product as documented in Griﬃn and Tang (2012). The
7The estimated misreporting probabilities do not change signiﬁcantly if we drop this
requirement.
8We admit that this two variables may not provide much information besides the
rating and therefore lead to a weaker identiﬁcation. But this is the current best proxy
we have. Despite the information content of the proxy, in the identiﬁcation part, we
show that our method works very well under our assumptions with the support from
simulation result.
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misreporting probabilities for all rating groups are around 5%. This result could
be interpreted as less asymmetric information in corporate rating comparing to
that in structured ﬁnance products which leads to less room for manipulation of
the ratings.
Second, the high rating groups have smaller number of misreporting proba-
bility than that for low rating groups. For example, the AAA rated ﬁrms would
be deﬂated as AA rating with a probability of 2%, as A rating with a probabil-
ity of 0.8%, as BBB rating with a probability of 0.2%, as BB&B rating with a
probability of 0.1%, and 0 probability for below B rating. In contrast, the Below
B rated ﬁrms would be inﬂated as BB&B rating with a probability of 6.5%, as
BBB rating with a probability of 0.5%, and 0 probability for other ratings. This
result is consistent with the facts that the CRAs are reluctant to give the highest
ratings. The last row of Table 2.3 report the total misreporting probability and
associated statistical signiﬁcance. The results are broadly consistent with those
in the individual cells in the matrix.
Third, the middle rating groups are less likely to receive a inﬂated or deﬂated
rating. The magnitude of misreporting for A, BBB, and BB&B rated groups are
small and not statistically signiﬁcant. The possible explanation would be that,
since there is a big jump in the BBB investment grade in bond rate, investors
would pay more attention to the ﬁrms around investment grade and therefore
the CRAs are less likely to do the inﬂation or deﬂation.
Overall, the misreporting pattern of CRAs shows a U-shape with left side (the
high rating groups) having lower misreporting probability (3%), middle having no
misreporting, and right side having high misreporting probability (6%). We also
test the statistical signiﬁcance by comparing the estimated matrix to the iden-
tity matrix. As shown in the methodology section, the estimated misreporting
probability follow the t-distribution.
2.4.3 Misreporting behavior across industries
As pointed out in Nickell et al. (2000), the transition probability matrix could
diﬀer a lot across the industry. Therefore, we would like to check whether the
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misreporting behavior also diﬀer a lot across the industry. We match the credit
rating data with COMPUSTAT and each industry deﬁned by 2-digit Global In-
dustry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS), we pool the matched samples to estimate
the misreporting probabilities. There are 10 industries in total but we only re-
port the result for 3 industryenergy, consumer staples, and ﬁnancial industry
(result for other industry are available upon request). The reason is that, we are
most interested in the ﬁnancial industry because it suﬀer the most during the
past crisis. We choose energy industry because it is most mature and predictable
with least asymmetric information. We randomly pick up the consumer staples
from all the other 8 industries.
Table 2.4 reports the results for 3 industries. There are signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences across industry for the misreporting behavior. We do not ﬁnd statistically
signiﬁcant misreporting in energy industry. Meanwhile, the misreporting prob-
ability is quite high in ﬁnancial industry and consumer staples industry. There
are some further diﬀerence in misreporting between ﬁnancial ﬁrms and consumer
staples ﬁrms as well. For example, the ﬁnancial ﬁrms are more likely to retain
the same rating for high rating groups (95.7%, 97.7%, and 99.2% for ﬁnancial
ﬁrms comparing to 90.7%, 93.8%, and 96.4% for consumer staples ﬁrms, for
AAA, AA, and A respectively). Also, ﬁnancial ﬁrms are more likely to inﬂate
the rating for low rating groups ( 9.4% and 37.9% comparing to 0.4% and 34.9%
for consumer staples ﬁrms, for BB&B and Below B respectively). Last the mis-
reporting magnitude (deﬁned as the rating rank jump from true to reported) is
higher for ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The largest misreporting magnitude for ﬁnancial ﬁrms
is from Below B rating jumping to AA with probability of 35.5%. In contrast, the
largest misreporting magnitude for consumer staples ﬁrms is from Below rating
jumping to BB&B. This result might suggest additional risk might be take into
consideration besides the direct use of reported ratings.
Besides the diﬀerence of the misreporting behavior across the industries, there
exist some consistent patterns across all the industries. The U-shape of the misre-
porting pattern still holds. The left side of U-shape (the high rating groups) has
lower misreporting probability, middle having lowest misreporting probability,
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and right side has high misreporting probability.
2.4.4 Misreporting behavior across business cycle
There are some theoretical papers on how the rating inﬂation might vary
across the business cycle. Bolton et al. (2012) model the competition among
CRAs and suggest that ratings are more likely to be inﬂated during booms and
when investors are more trusting. Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) exam-
ine the incentives of a monopoly CRA to inﬂate ratings in a model of endogenous
reputation and ﬁnd that reputation cycles may exist where a CRA build up its
reputation by replying information accurately only to exploit this reputation later
by collecting fees for inﬂated ratings.
We formally test the misreporting behavior across business cycle by estimat-
ing the misreporting probability in each stage of business cycle. Using the data
from NBER's Business Cycle Dating Committee9, we divide the business cy-
cle into 3 stagesrecession, normal, and boom by sorting the yearly real GDP
growth rate into tercile. The top tercile with highest real GDP growth rate is
deﬁned as boom and the bottom tercile with lowest real GDP growth rate is
deﬁned as recession.
Table 2.5 reports the misreporting result for ﬁrms during economic boom
and recession. Overall, the total misreporting probability is quite comparable
but the pattern is quite diﬀerent. During economic boom, CRAs are more likely
to inﬂate the rating. Meanwhile, CRAs are more likely to deﬂate the rating
during economic recessions. For example, for the below B rating groups, the
ﬁrms are inﬂated with a probability of 35.2% during economic boom comparing
to 27.4% in economic recession. For rating groups AA, A, BBB, and BB&B
during economic boom, although the misreporting probability is quite similar to
that during economic recession, they are more concentrated in inﬂation instead
of deﬂation.
Overall, our result suggests that, although there are misreporting during
economic boom and recession, inﬂation are more severe when the economic is
9http://www.nber.org/cycles/recessions.html#navDiv=4
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booming. Our result are more support of the procyclical credit inﬂation.
2.5 Robustness checks
In this section, we perform several robustness check to ensure the validity of
our estimation method and some more robustness for diﬀerent subsample analy-
sis.
2.5.1 Evaluation of the assumptions
In this section, we evaluate the key assumptions which are essential to our
identiﬁcation results. We preform extensive Monte Carlo simulations to examine
the robustness of our estimator to deviations from Assumption 1, 3. We also test
the validity of Assumption 4 and 5 directly using ratings data. For Assumption 6,
we argue that it is likely to hold based on prevailing using of the rating in trading
and regulation requirement. Although the evaluation result is not reported in
the paper, We summarize the main things we have done.
We start with a baseline data generating process (DGP) which satisﬁes all
the maintained assumptions, and show the consistency of our estimator. After
that, we allow the DGP deviate from the baseline case to check the robustness
of our estimator when each of the assumption is violated.
Assumption 1 imposes conditional independence on the transition of the un-
derlying true credit ratings. In the Monte Carlo simulation setup, we relax this
assumption to allow the transition of the true ratings to depend on that 12 months
earlier, i.e., Pr(R∗t+12|R∗t , R∗t−12) 6= Pr(R∗t+12|R∗t ). Our simulation results show
that the estimator is robust to reasonable deviations to Assumption 1.
Assumption 3 imposes conditional independence of the misreporting pro-
cess. We have considered three diﬀerent kinds of deviations to this assump-
tion in our Monte Carlo simulations. In the ﬁrst case, we allow the misre-
portings to be correlated with the latent true ratings 12 months earlier, i.e.,
Pr(Rt|R∗t , X,R 6=t, R∗6=t) = Pr(Rt|R∗t , R∗t−12, X). In the second case, misre-
porting may be correlated with the reported ratings 12 months earlier, i.e.,
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Pr(Rt|R∗t , X,R 6=t, R∗6=t) = Pr(Rt|R∗t , Rt−12, X). Lastly, we consider a general re-
laxation, i.e., Pr(Rt|R∗t , X,R 6=t, R∗6=t) = Pr(Rt|R∗t , R∗t−12, Rt−12, X). In all cases,
our simulation results show that our estimator is robust to reasonable deviations
from Assumption 3.
Assumption 4 requires an observed matrix to be invertible, and therefore, is
directly testable from the ratings data. We use bootstrapping to show that the
determinant of this matrix is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, which implies that
the matrix is invertible.
Under Assumption 1, 3 and 4, 5 requires that the eigenvalues of an observed
matrix be distinct. We may also directly test this assumption using the ratings
data by estimating the diﬀerence between the eigenvalues. Our bootstrapping
results show that the absolute diﬀerences between the eigenvalues are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, which implies that the eigenvalues are distinctive.
Assumption 6 implies that credit rating agency is more likely to report the
true rating than any other possible values. We believe this assumption is intu-
itively reasonable. Also, we are not aware of any studies in the literature that
report anything in violation of this assumption.
All the simulation results on the evaluation of assumptions are available upon
request.
2.5.2 Exclusion of recent ﬁnancial crisis period
We exclude the sample period later than 2006 to check whether the misre-
porting behavior is due to that in the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Table 2.6 reports
the results. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancial industry has smaller misreporting magnitude
before recent ﬁnancial crisis. For example, for the whole sample, the largest
misreporting magnitude for ﬁnancial ﬁrms is from Below B rating jumping to
AA with probability of 35.5%. In contrast, before the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the
largest misreporting magnitude for ﬁnancial ﬁrms is from Below rating jumping
to BBB with a probability of 34.9%. This result is consistent with the Cornaggia,




We use a novel estimation method to explicitly estimate the misreporting
probability for each rating groups of the credit rating agency. we treat the re-
ported corporate credit rating as a function of the underlying unobserved true
credit rating. We then impose a structure on the misreporting process and the
dynamics of the underlying latent true credit rating and identify two sources of
diﬀerence between the true rating and the reported rating by CRAs. The ﬁrst er-
ror is the "mis-assessment", which is the noise from the unobservable true rating
to the rating perceived by CRAs (the internal rating). This is because the CRAs
may not 100% accurately infer the true quality of the ﬁrms. The second error
is "misreporting", which is the diﬀerence between the rating perceived by CRAs
and the rating reported by CRAs. We ﬁnd that, overall, the mis-assessment in
the credit rating is very small and statistically insigniﬁcant. The misreporting
pattern of CRAs shows a U-shape with left side (the high rating groups) having
lower misreporting probability (3%), middle having no misreporting, and right
side having high misreporting probability (6%). Meanwhile, there is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence across rating groups, industry, and business cycle.
Our results contribute to the debate of the credit rating accuracy that the
reported rating do not reﬂect the true rating of the ﬁrms. Failure to correct for
the misreporting probability might understate the risk of low rating ﬁrms. Future
research would be extended to measure how this misreporting probability aﬀect
the bond price. Also, prior research document the inﬂated ratings of structured
products and their contribution to the ﬁnancial crisis. Our result shows that
there are misreporting outside the crisis period as well.
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Figure 2.1: Model setup
This ﬁgure shows the model setup. The R∗s are the unobserved true rating.
The r∗s are the unobserved internal rating by CRAs. The rs are the reported
rating by CRAs. Since CRAs normally reevaluate the rating once a year unless
signiﬁcant corporate events occur, such as merger and acquisition, we use data
one year apart to mitigate the inﬂuence of past reported rating on future reported
rating when conditional on observed rating. This is to alleviate the concern of
time series correlation of the reported ratings. Therefore, our model allow the
autocorrelation between credit rating to be up to 11 time steps.
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Table 2.1: Yearly distribution of the ratings
This table displays the S&P Long-Term Issuer credit rating distribution across
the entire sample. We aggregate the monthly data into yearly observation. There
are 21 diﬀerent levels of rating by the rating agency and we regroup them into
6 categories: All the AAA level rating to be category 1; All the AA level rating
to be category 2; All the A level rating to be category 3; category 4 includes all
the triple B rating, i.e BBB+, BBB,BBB-; category 5 includes all the double B
rating, i.e BB+, BB,BB-; and category 6 consists of all rating left.
Rating category
year AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below
B
Total
1986 664 3,694 8,171 10,032 20,217 2,027 44,805
1987 690 3,589 7,936 9,941 21,003 2,121 45,280
1988 663 3,381 7,934 9,855 20,715 2,079 44,627
1989 705 3,015 8,123 9,885 20,288 2,056 44,072
1990 690 2,989 7,754 10,013 19,423 1,915 42,784
1991 668 2,826 7,629 10,071 18,747 1,965 41,906
1992 634 2,821 7,659 10,025 18,771 1,868 41,778
1993 582 2,701 7,809 10,216 19,059 1,600 41,967
1994 560 2,652 7,743 10,332 19,432 1,315 42,034
1995 552 2,513 7,823 10,476 19,090 1,427 41,881
1996 571 2,427 7,903 10,347 19,339 1,372 41,959
1997 541 2,405 7,849 10,725 19,439 1,247 42,206
1998 505 2,357 7,665 10,819 19,211 1,216 41,773
1999 474 2,321 7,421 10,740 18,856 1,627 41,439
2000 409 2,080 7,144 10,443 18,305 1,843 40,224
2001 356 1,725 6,845 10,180 17,371 2,183 38,660
2002 314 1,461 6,249 10,018 16,620 2,165 36,827
2003 277 1,209 5,825 9,579 16,454 2,003 35,347
2004 255 1,183 5,460 9,531 16,444 1,492 34,365
2005 229 1,188 5,260 9,379 15,684 1,171 32,911
2006 223 1,215 5,011 8,945 14,888 950 31,232
2007 212 1,263 4,673 8,535 13,958 751 29,392
2008 198 1,220 4,438 8,330 12,665 813 27,664
2009 154 1,000 4,057 8,259 11,315 1,599 26,384
2010 128 873 4,038 8,056 11,121 899 25,115
2011 128 788 4,072 7,925 10,205 668 23,786
Total 11,382 54,896 172,491 252,657 448,620 40,372 980,418
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Table 2.2: One year transition probability matrix for credit ratings entire
sample
This table displays estimation of one year transition probability matrix for re-
ported and true ratings for whole sample. The sample includes all ﬁrms with a
Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating from S&P and the sample period is from 1986
to 2011. The true rating transition matrix is estimated using method proposed
in the paper. There are 21 diﬀerent levels of rating by the rating agency and
we regroup them into 6 categories: All the AAA level rating to be category 1;
All the AA level rating to be category 2; All the A level rating to be category
3; category 4 includes all the triple B rating, i.e BBB+, BBB,BBB-; category 5
includes all the double B rating, i.e BB+, BB,BB-; and category 6 consists of all
rating left.
Panel A: The transition matrix using observed ratings
Rating category for 12 months later
Current rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.9005 0.0838 0.0109 0.0002 0.0027 0.00001
AA 0.0102 0.858 0.118 0.0105 0.0024 0.0001
A 0.0001 0.0236 0.876 0.0869 0.0108 0.0014
BBB 0.002 0.0021 0.0474 0.875 0.0703 0.0042
BB&B 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 0.0390 0.918 0.0384
Below B 0.0 0.0003 0.00066 0.0273 0.384 0.581
Panel B: The estimated transition matrix after correction of misreporting
Rating category for 12 months later
Current rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.943 0.052 0 0 0.005 0
AA 0.002 0.91 0.087 0 0.002 0
A 0 0.012 0.923 0.065 0 0.001
BBB 0 0.001 0.028 0.919 0.05 0.002
BB&B 0 0 0.001 0.029 0.929 0.041
Below B 0 0 0 0.006 0.179 0.815
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Table 2.3: Misreporting probability for each rating group  entire sample
This table displays estimation of misreporting probability for entire sample. The
sample includes all ﬁrms with a Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating from S&P and
the sample period is from 1986 to 2011. There are 21 diﬀerent levels of rating
by the rating agency and we regroup them into 6 categories: All the AAA level
rating to be category 1; All the AA level rating to be category 2; All the A level
rating to be category 3; category 4 includes all the triple B rating, i.e BBB+,
BBB,BBB-; category 5 includes all the double B rating, i.e BB+, BB,BB-; and
category 6 consists of all rating left. The diagonal of matrix stands for the trust-
fully reporting probability and the cells in upper triangle stand for the inﬂation
probability. The cells in lower triable stand for the deﬂation probability. The *
stands for statistical diﬀerence between this matrix and identity matrix (cell to
cell). ***signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. .
True Rating
Reported rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.969** 0.004 0.001 0 0 0
AA 0.02** 0.972*** 0 0 0 0
A 0.008 0.018*** 0.988 0.003 0 0
BBB 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.995 0.006 0.001
BB&B 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.994 0.065***
Below B 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.934***
Total misreporting Prob. 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.066***
66
Table 2.4: Misreporting behavior diﬀerence across industries
This table displays estimation of misreporting probability for each rating groups.
The sample includes all ﬁrms with a Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating from S&P
and the sample period is from 1986 to 2011. The ﬁnancial ﬁrms are deﬁned as 2-
digit GICS equal to 40. The energy ﬁrms are deﬁned as 2-digit GICS equal to 10.
The ﬁnancial ﬁrms are deﬁned as 2-digit GICS equal to 30.The diagonal of matrix
stands for the trustfully reporting probability and the cells in upper triangle
stand for the inﬂation probability. . The cells in lower triable stand for the
deﬂation probability. The * stands for statistical diﬀerence between this matrix
and identity matrix (cell to cell). ***signiﬁcant at the 1% level, **signiﬁcant at
the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Panel A: Misreporting matrix for ﬁnancial industry
True Rating
Reported rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.957*** 0 0 0 0 0
AA 0.04*** 0.977*** 0.001 0 0 0.355***
A 0.002*** 0.019*** 0.992*** 0.002 0.002 0
BBB 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.998 0.094*** 0.002
BB&B 0 0 0.004 0 0.903*** 0.021
Below B 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.621***
Total misreporting Prob. 0.043*** 0.023*** 0.008*** 0.002 0.097*** 0.379***
Panel B: Misreporting matrix for energy industry
True Rating
Reported rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.996 0 0 0 0 0
AA 0.004 0.936** 0 0 0 0
A 0 0.047** 0.99* 0.002 0.001 0.001
BBB 0 0 0.009* 0.996* 0.007 0.004*
BB&B 0 0.004 0 0.001** 0.985 0.076
Below B 0 0.013 0 0 0.007 0.92
Total misreporting Prob. 0.004 0.064 0.01 0.004 0.015 0.08
Panel C: Misreporting matrix for consumer staples industry
True Rating
Reported rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.907*** 0 0.019*** 0 0 0
AA 0.069*** 0.938*** 0 0.001 0 0
A 0.02 0.043*** 0.964*** 0 0 0
BBB 0.004 0.019 0.018*** 0.981*** 0.003 0.001
BB&B 0 0 0 0.018*** 0.996 0.348***
Below B 0 0 0 0 0.001 0.651***
Total misreporting Prob. 0.093*** 0.062*** 0.036*** 0.019*** 0.004 0.349***
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Table 2.5: Misreporting behavior across business cycle
This table displays estimation of misreporting probability for each rating groups.
The sample includes all ﬁrms with a Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating from S&P
and the sample period is from 1986 to 2011. There are 21 diﬀerent levels of rating
by the rating agency and we regroup them into 6 categories: All the AAA level
rating to be category 1; All the AA level rating to be category 2; All the A level
rating to be category 3; category 4 includes all the triple B rating, i.e BBB+,
BBB,BBB-; category 5 includes all the double B rating, i.e BB+, BB,BB-; and
category 6 consists of all rating left. We divide the sample into tercile base on
real GDP growth rate. The years in highest growth rate tercile are deﬁned as
economic boom and the years with lowest growth rate are deﬁned as economic
recession. . The diagonal of matrix stands for the trustfully reporting probability
and the cells in upper triangle stand for the inﬂation probability. The cells in
lower triable stand for the deﬂation probability. The * stands for statistical
diﬀerence between this matrix and identity matrix (cell to cell). ***signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, **signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Panel A Misreporting behavior during economic boom
True Rating
Reported rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.879*** 0.002*** 0 0 0 0.001
AA 0.09*** 0.894*** 0.026*** 0.002 0.001 0.077**
A 0.027*** 0.093*** 0.931*** 0.022*** 0.001 0.067**
BBB 0.003 0.009*** 0.037*** 0.932*** 0.017*** 0.014
BB&B 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.041*** 0.97*** 0.194***
Below B 0 0 0 0.003 0.011*** 0.648***
Total misreporting Prob. 0.121*** 0.106*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.03*** 0.352***
Panel B Misreporting behavior during economic recession
True Rating
Reported rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.864*** 0.002 0 0 0 0
AA 0.121*** 0.92*** 0.016*** 0.001 0 0.001
A 0.013 0.065*** 0.96*** 0.025*** 0.001 0.004
BBB 0.002 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.941*** 0.013** 0.012
BB&B 0 0.001 0.005 0.03*** 0.967*** 0.258***
Below B 0 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.018** 0.726***
Total misreporting Prob. 0.136*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.059*** 0.033** 0.274***
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Table 2.6: Misreporting probability for ﬁnancial ﬁrms (exclude current ﬁ-
nancial crisis)
This table displays estimation of misreporting probability for each rating groups.
The sample includes all ﬁrms with a Long-Term Issuer Credit Rating from S&P
and the sample period is from 1986 to 2011. There are 21 diﬀerent levels of rating
by the rating agency and we regroup them into 6 categories: All the AAA level
rating to be category 1; All the AA level rating to be category 2; All the A level
rating to be category 3; category 4 includes all the triple B rating, i.e BBB+,
BBB,BBB-; category 5 includes all the double B rating, i.e BB+, BB,BB-; and
category 6 consists of all rating left.The ﬁnancial ﬁrms are deﬁned as 2-digit GICS
equal to 40.The diagonal of matrix stands for the trustfully reporting probability
and the cells in upper triangle stand for the inﬂation probability. . The cells
in lower triable stand for the deﬂation probability. The * stands for statistical
diﬀerence between this matrix and identity matrix (cell to cell). ***signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, **signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
True Rating
Reported rating
AAA AA A BBB BB&B Below B
AAA 0.938*** 0.001 0.001 0 0.001 0
AA 0.052*** 0.953*** 0.007*** 0 0.001 0
A 0.006 0.042*** 0.976 0.015*** 0.004 0.005
BBB 0.004 0.005 0.009*** 0.969*** 0.018 0.349***
BB&B 0 0.001 0.007 0.015*** 0.976 0.046
Below B 0 0 0 0.001 0.001 0.599***






.1 Simulation for testing the consistency of es-
timator
This section presents some Monte Carlo evidence to support the validation
of the method that using eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition technique to es-
timate the misreporting probabilities through observed data. Let R∗t denote the
latent true rating in period t with possible values of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. For the sake
of simplicity, we ignore the observed state variables since all the analysis are
identical when we condition on ﬁrm characteristics. Assuming the underlying
rating grade follows a ﬁrst order Markov Chain with a transition matrix as:
prob(R∗t+12|R∗t , ....R∗1) = prob(R∗t+12|R∗t )
Providing this transition matrix, we can random draw a series of underlying
ratings: {R∗t+12, R∗t , R∗t−12}i=1,...ns.
Regarding the mis-assessment distribution that aﬀect the accuracy of what
the agent think about the company, we assume it to be i.i.d across time and
only depends on the current true rating. The mis-assessment distribution is
captured by prob(r∗t |R∗t ). So sampling the rating CRA perceives in each pe-
riod t relies on the latent rating and this mis-assessment distribution. From
{R∗t+12, R∗t , R∗t−12}i=1,...ns and prob(r∗t |R∗t ), we can draw {r∗t+12, r∗t , r∗t−12}i=1,...ns.
CRA provides the rating rt and rating outlook wt for the ﬁrm given
it observe r∗t in period t. We assume the reporting behavior is consis-
tent over time, meaning the reporting distributions for both grade and rat-
ing outlook are stationary, i.e prob(rt|r∗t ) = prob(rτ |r∗τ ), for t 6= τ and
prob(wt|r∗t ) = prob(rτ |r∗τ ), for t 6= τ . With these two probability distributions
and {r∗t+12, r∗t , r∗t−12}i=1,...ns, we can simulate the rating and the rating outlook
that CRA reports, {rt+12, rt, rt−12, wt+12, wt, wt−12}i=1,...ns
Applying our methodology to the simulated data, ﬁrst we calculate Pr(rt+12 =
k, rt = i, rt−12 = j) and Pr(rt = i, rt−12 = j) for k, i, j ∈ {1, 2...,K} and then





rt,rt−12 = Prt|r∗tDk|r∗t P
−1
rt|R∗t
Then, we can identify the misreporting distribution from the normalized
eigenvectors of matrix Pk,rt,rt−12P
−1
rt,rt−12
Speciﬁcally, we assume the true rating transition matrix and misreporting
matrix are as follow:
TRUER∗t+12|R∗t ≡

Pr(R∗t+12 = 1|R∗t = 1) ... P r(R∗t+12 = 1|R∗t = 6)
Pr(R∗t+12 = 2|R∗t = 1) ... P r(R∗t+12 = 2|R∗t = 6)
. . .




0.85 0.10 0 0.00 0 0.01
0.05 0.7 0.07 0.05 0 0.02
0.04 0.12 0.8 0.00 0.05 0.03
0.03 0.01 0.1 0.85 0.02 0.04
0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.93 0.15




Pr(r∗t = 1|R∗t = 1) ... P r(r∗t = 1|R∗t = 6)
Pr(r∗t = 2|R∗t = 1) ... P r(r∗t = 2|R∗t = 6)
. . .




0.9 0.15 0.1 0 0 0
0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0
0 0.05 0.6 0.05 0 0.03
0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.01
0 0 0.1 0.15 0.9 0.06





Pr(rt = 1|r∗t = 1) ... P r(rt = 1|r∗t = 6)
Pr(rt = 2|r∗t = 1) ... P r(rt = 2|r∗t = 6)
. . .




0.9 0.10 0 0.02 0 0.01
0.02 0.8 0.07 0.05 0 0.02
0.03 0.02 0.9 0.04 0 0.04
0.03 0.01 0 0.79 0.02 0.04
0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.98 0.04
0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0 0.85

We sample 5, 000, 000 observations and repeat 500 times, then apply our
method to this simulated sample to estimate misreporting matrix and noise to
check the consistency of our estimators.
We get the estimated matrix as follows:
MISREPORT_Estimated ≡

0.8965 0.0995 0.0021 0.02 0.0006 0.0105
0.0206 0.8006 0.0694 0.05 0.0015 0.0201
0.0297 0.0199 0.8917 0.0399 0.0025 0.0401
0.0299 0.0102 0.0028 0.7899 0.0199 0.0403
0.0197 0.0597 0.0142 0.0502 0.975 0.04





0.0084 0.0052 0.0022 0.0018 0.0006 0.0051
0.006 0.0095 0.0046 0.0038 0.0016 0.0041
0.0035 0.0034 0.0099 0.002 0.0019 0.0017
0.0025 0.0038 0.0028 0.0083 0.0037 0.0064
0.0032 0.0065 0.0093 0.006 0.005 0.0023




0.8909 0.1423 0.0986 0.003 0.0033 0.0067
0.0914 0.8405 0.098 0.0038 0.0019 0.0073
0.0031 0.0045 0.6062 0.0436 0.0024 0.033
0.0046 0.0057 0.097 0.7764 0.095 0.0656
0.0075 0.0038 0.0969 0.1467 0.895 0.0561




0.0291 0.0205 0.0093 0.005 0.0052 0.018
0.0233 0.0256 0.0159 0.0063 0.0033 0.0215
0.0052 0.0069 0.017 0.0157 0.0036 0.0319
0.0076 0.009 0.0084 0.0463 0.0083 0.0599
0.0102 0.006 0.0129 0.027 0.0104 0.0206
0.0043 0.0051 0.0038 0.0362 0.0036 0.0913

The t-tests could be conducted for cell-to-cell diﬀerence between true and
estimated misreporting matrix. Comparing the true and estimated misreporting
matrix, we can see that the diﬀerence between these two matrices is reasonably
small and all cells are statistically insigniﬁcant. In untabulated analyses, the
diﬀerence between true misreporting matrix and estimated misreporting matrix
becomes smaller when the simulation sample size increase. Therefore, our method
is able to correctly estimate the misreporting probability.
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